Wittgenstein, Ludwig

Philosophical Investigations (3rd Edition)
Average customer rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars
  • Language games: controversial notion, but most thought provoking
  • Interesting short read, but not challenging
  • Not one of the great books.
  • Learn from it but there is no need to worship it
  • essential philosophy for intelligent reader
 Philosophical Investigations (3rd Edition)
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Manufacturer: Prentice Hall
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0024288101

Amazon.com

Written by one of the century's truly great thinkers, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is a remarkable--and surprisingly approachable--collection of insights, statements, and nearly displayed thinking habits of the philosopher's work on language, symbols, categories, and a host of other topics. Organized into nearly 700 short observations, this book is a treasure trove for anyone who needs to think carefully about objects, categories, and symbols, especially in relation to structured logic applications in computer programming.

The short (and sometimes aphoristic) observations in Philosophical Investigations allow the reader to ponder basic questions on what describes a category, how language works in everyday situations, and how symbols function to represent our world.

Originally a series of notes to himself as he lectured on philosophy, the book is a brilliant grab bag of thought and example. Often framed as a question ("How do I recognize that this is red?"), the philosopher provides short answers in a sentence or two, never more than a paragraph. (The second part of the book uses longer answers of several pages to develop its arguments.) An index lets the reader browse on topics of interest--such as language, concept, games, or naming.

Any artificial intelligence researcher looking to understand human language will be intrigued by Wittgenstein's ideas on how symbols and language operate. And for anyone who designs software with objects, this book's careful attention to thinking about what makes a good category demonstrates rigorous thinking about everyday objects and things. Philosophical Investigations is at times a strange and often wonderful book that reveals the thought processes of one of history's finest minds. It exposes the fundamental problems of using language as a means of teaching machines to think using words. --Richard Dragan

<B>Topics covered</B>: Theory of language and language games, meaning and symbols, concepts and categories, behavior, games (including chess), color, images and perception, grammar and language, sensations, theory of mind and thinking.

Customer Reviews:

5 out of 5 stars Language games: controversial notion, but most thought provoking.......2007-01-02

One aspect of this book that makes it important for simply that contribution is the notion of "language games." If language produces reality, different languages produce different realities. In this book, German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein developed the related notion of "language games," islands of language, unique each to itself, not wholly translatable one into another. Each of us inhabits a particular language game, he claims, which channels how we see things and understand the world and our places within it. Again, language shapes meaning and understanding and interpretation. The world is disclosed to us through our specific language game. If we live in different language games, we see different worlds. This concept entails, as philosopher Chantal Mouffe says, ". . . a critique of the rationalist conception of the subject [i.e., the knowing, reasoning human mind] that indicates that the latter cannot be the source of linguistic meanings since it is through participation in different language games that the world is disclosed to us."

This is a serious attack on the Modern conception of the human as a reasoning being who can affect change in desired directions through the exercise of that reason. Thus, reason does NOT allow us to see the world as it is and to change it as we wish in a manner leading to progress. The concept of language games is key for many postmodern thinkers.

If we think through language and the use of language is thought itself, what is perceived is indistinct from language use. The two cannot be separated, since language governs interpretation and perception and thought. To revisit the phrase from Wittgenstein, different people play and live in different "language games," that is, their languages lead them to see the world differently, to conceptualize things differently from those in different language games. So what for the person interested in politics?

In the final analysis, this means that whenever we try to understand the world, it is through language, through interpretation, since we cannot directly perceive reality outside of our language. This begins to suggest the likelihood that one's own culture or society or polity does not have universally "true" answers to key questions of human existence; our culture develops answers within its language game that make sense at that particular time for that culture. All is interpretation of uncertain texts within different language games.

Certainly, this is a strong argument. Many disagree that language per se shapes our views of reality. And that argument needs to be taken seriously. Nonetheless, the argument about "language games," although only a small part of this book, is a provocative concept, well worth thinking about.

3 out of 5 stars Interesting short read, but not challenging.......2005-12-21

I think many readers are turned off by the broken up nature of the text. The format does not bother me. Wittgenstein freely admits in the preface that he did not have time to finsh the book or do it justice. Instead we have a series of numbered paragraphs/thoughts/ideas/questions. My favorite investigateion, if I were to pick one, was #47, that was a highpoint of the book for me. Look that one up for a taste of the book.

He is boiling down communication to its bare essentials or building blocks. He focuses on what it takes to truly convey a meaning to someone else. Most of the thoughts seem to explore language as a communication tool coupled with shared experience and intuition.

Maybe I've read other authors who explored these concepts before I've read Wittgenstein. Maybe this truly was ground breaking at the time, I'm no historian or profesional philosopher (if there is such a thing). It is certainly worth reading but it is not on my list of favorites. The book didn't change my world view. Maybe I just agree with him and look through a similar projectory as his world view. I was really optimistic going into this book, but can only give it a 3 because I will probably never read it again. 4 is for books I will probably read again, 5 are my favorites.

1 out of 5 stars Not one of the great books........2005-06-12

Wittgenstein was cryptic in the extreme. This has been mistaken for wisdom. Though he was considered an oracle by the 20th century he is likely, as was Herbert Spencer, famous in his own day, to be ignored by the subsequent generation.

This is not a book to spend much time on if you have real philosophical problems to solve. If you are looking for curios in the history of philosophy, by all means spend an hour.

5 out of 5 stars Learn from it but there is no need to worship it.......2005-02-25

This is a book which at one time was worshipped. It was taken to be the holy text that gave the true answers to the philosophical puzzles that graduate students in philosophy were puzzling over. Wittgenstein was the hero and his manner of ' doing philosophy' of walking and holding his forehead, and waiting in silence and thinking for long stretches of time while puzzling it out was imitated by his many followers. The 'Investigations' did not like the 'Tractatus ' before it present the system that would tell the whole truth , answer it all , as it were. It instead put the focus on philosophizing as an activity. And it is a remarkable, enigmatic, aphoristic text rich in suggestions and quandaries. It truly is a book that presents perplexing questions and makes it seem as if ' thinking' is a most serious and difficult business.
From the work come key concepts which have been added to ' vocabulary ' of philosophical. Wittgenstein 'Seek the use not the meaning' puts him of course in the company of the pragmatists. The concept of ' family resemblance' in defining a concept in which one does not see a single clear definition, but rather sees 'variations' whose ' meanings overlap' as in a Venn diagram is another powerful tool of analysis. ' Letting the fly out of the fly bottle' another metaphor for philosophizing too suggested the turn to ordinary language and everyday common experience as central for philosophizing. And this away from the formal abstract logical thinking of 'The Tractatus'.
Another point. The 'Philosophical Investigations' is a hard book to understand. And part of the mystique of Wittgenstein is the sense of his incredible ' genius mind' which most of us even those studying philosophy, cannot grasp.
My own sense is that if you ask trivial questions you get trivial answers. And that of course much of the metaphysical and religious discourse philosophical analysis, logical positivism dismissed as nonsense is precisely what is important. 'The Investigations' opens more in the direction( I believe) of allowing for these kinds of meaning. But I am not sure about this.
Another point. I do not pretend to understand not only not fully, not even ' largely' 'The Investigations'. The sense of not understanding though puzzling over it of course said something to me about my own ' lesser powers' in philosophy.
Years later I would simply recommend to readers of the work to not take it with the kind of seriousness we did then. Take it as an interesting text, even a poetic text, and parse it and find meanings in it which hopefully will enrich your life and philosophical understanding.
Do not pray to it. Wittgenstein was a great mind , but a mind to be studied and understood, a frail and fragmented mind also, and not to be worshipped.

5 out of 5 stars essential philosophy for intelligent reader.......2004-08-15

A lot of philosophers today are dissatisfied with what they see as a contemptuous attitude of Wittgenstein towards the traditional method of philosophical inquiry: 1)looking at philosophical problem 2)analyzing it 3)formulating a theory capable of explaining it. They are right. Wittgenstein really had an intention to "prove philosophy to be a worthless activity". He possessed a method of his own: 1)looking at a traditional philosophical problem 2)analyzing it 3)finding inconsistencies in the logic of the problem or conceptual confusion involved in formulation of this problem. Whether or not he was right in thinking that this method is capable of solving ALL philosophical problems, there are some interesting arguments in this book.

I would like to list some of them to give an impression of what this book is like.

Famous PRIVATE LANGUAGE, for example, is directed against a version of scepticism called SOLIPSISM. (solipsism is the view that any assertion of the existence of external world and /or minds of other people is meaningless because we can perceive only contents of our own mind). Rather then trying to find an argument justifying the inference of the existence of other human minds from the observable human behavior, Wittgenstein challenges the common-sense conception we have of our consciousness (the one we share with Descartes). His perspective is interesting, especially the idea that our familiarity with our sensations is dependent upon our understanding of language.

Another argument, which I call VISUAL ROOM ARGUMENT, concerns itself with the supposedly private nature of perception (looking, imagining). Problem which Wittgenstein discusses is so subtle that readers who didnt previously "discovered" this problem independently will not understand what the hell is he talking about. Those, however, who already felt troubled by it will be puzzled by sheer power of Wittgenstein intellect, when they grasp the connection between the this problem and the cluster of other problems concerning personal identity.

Apart from "dissolving" traditional philosophical problems, Wittgenstein also provides some simple but precise observations that drive us to the boundary of the territory where reason could be applied. He discusses the process of reading by urging us to engage in series of practical experiments, such as reading the numbers on wrist watch, while observing our mind processes in a way he suggests, or reading a line of nonsense while silently "saying to ourselves" meaningful sentence and then comparing the experience to our ordinary experiences of reading. Wittgenstein never forces us to adopt any particular doctrine (apart from his philosophy of language, which became rather notorious in academic circles), but anybody who will perform these experiments honestly will certanly look on his own mind from different perspective.

--------------------------

Those who dont have any philosophical education need not worry. Wittgenstein despised philosophical jargon. He didnt use word "solipsism" in the private language argument. You wount find any logical formulas in PI. (this is not Quine). There is no references to other philosophers (apart from one or two mentions of Frege and James). HOwever Wittgenstein is not easy. Logical rigor of analytical philosophy can be overwhelming to those used to reading of Nietzsche and Kirkegaard.
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (Routledge Classics)
Average customer rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars
  • Worth a PHD for the writer.
  • 'The world is all that is the case'
  • A modern Classic
  • Dissolving Philosophy By Logical Atomism
  • another perspective
 Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (Routledge Classics)
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Manufacturer: Routledge
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0415254086

Book Description

Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme brilliance, it captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers. For Wittgenstein, logic was something we use to conquer a reality which is in itself both elusive and unobtainable. He famously summarized the book in the following words: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.' David Pears and Brian McGuinness received the highest praise for their meticulous translation. The work is prefaced by Bertrand Russell's original introduction to the first English edition.

Customer Reviews:

5 out of 5 stars Worth a PHD for the writer........2007-04-02

"That which we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence".

5 out of 5 stars 'The world is all that is the case'.......2006-11-24

The Tractatus was Wittgenstein's attempt to solve all philosophical problems. Believing he was successful, he retired from Philosophy after publishing this text to become a schoolteacher for several years in Austria, before returning to philosophy.

The Tractatus is one of the most important intellectual works of the 20th century, arguably as important as Bertrand Russell's and Whitehead's 'Principa Mathematica', Heidigger's 'Being and Time', and Husserl's 'Logical Investigations.' This little work, beautiful in its logical simplicity and purity, can be regarded as the manifesto of analytical philosophy in the 20th century.

The Tractus is essentially a work dealing with epistemology, what we can and cannot know about the world. However, rather than looking at the mind or conciousness or sensations, Wittgenstein instead looks at how we use language and logic to describe the world. If we can solve the inherent logical ambiguity of language, we can then solve philosophical problems which are in fact simply faults which come from lack of logical coherence or clarity when we use language to make certain statements about things and the relationship between things.

Wittgenstein's approach is somewhat reductionistic. The propositional format of the work mirrors the Ethics of Spinoza, though for Wittgenstein the world is made of certain basic atomistic components which have fairly simple relations to each other. These arrangements may change in space and time but the world remains the same.

A number of propositions deal with logical problems explored by Russell, Frege and others. Some of these are very abstract and subtle and require careful study to properly understand.

Towards the end of the treatise Wittgenstein's concerns seem to border on the mystical. 'It is not what the world is, but that it is, which is mystical' and 'What we cannot speak of, we have to pass over in silence.' These Zenlike statements seem to hint at a deep mystery about things which crops up when we reach questions beyond the scope of language and logic, which can only be approached with silent contemplation, somewhat like Nicholas of Cusa's approach to the mystery of God. While Wittgenstein was not a religious man, his statements in this sense have often been quoted by philosophers and scientists whenever a metaphysical question which seems unanswerable arises in their discourse.

Wittgenstein later abandoned many of the statements he made in the Tractatus when he returned to philosophy, instead focusing more on problems with language rather than logic. This is somewhat unfortunate, given the elegance and beauty of this work from the philosophical viewpoint.

While the ambitions of Wittgenstein to solve all problems by clearing up our usage of language may seem excessive looking back, the clarity and precision of this work is admirable and the project worthwhile. For this and for many other reasons, it remains a work worth studying carefully and with sympathy, even after a century or so after its publication.

4 out of 5 stars A modern Classic .......2006-02-07

Originally published in 1921 Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is arguably the most influential piece of twentieth century philosophical writing. This edition contains the well respected 1961 Pears and McGuinness translation as well as the introduction to the original English edition by Bertrand Russell. I offer the following comments for potential readers.

Despite its unquestioned historical significance the Tractatus is not necessarily a good entry point into Wittgenstein's thought. Arguably, if one were to read it not aware of the context within it which it was written it might seem pedantic and tedious - it is largely focused on addressing logico-linguistic questions prevalent at the outset of the twentieth century. From my perspective, an understanding of Frege and Russell is essential to appreciating the Tractatus. In particular it is important to have an appreciation for Frege's notions of concept, and his views on sense and reference; Whereas, Russell's approach to names and descriptions is also important.

Although I appreciate Wittgenstein's work in the fields of language and logic I think his influence on modern philosophy has not been entirely positive. For instance it could be argued that the Logical-Positivist movement stemming from Wittgenstein's early work steered philosophical discussion into and sterile and uninteresting period where large metaphysical questions were deemed out of bonds (undoubtedly some would consider this a good thing).

Overall, the Tractatus is a classic in modern philosophy - an important read for all serious students. For non-Wittgenstein enthusiasts, however, it can be a difficult read in early twentieth century analytic philosophy.


5 out of 5 stars Dissolving Philosophy By Logical Atomism.......2005-12-16

Since most of the reviews of the Tractatus here contain either fawning praise or vituperation without much expository content, it may perhaps be useful to give an account, in reasonably clear terms, of what this book is actually about. Granted that my account is somewhat simplified, it will still be better than quasi-mystical gushing praise or bitter unargued criticism. The central idea of the Tractatus is expressed very clearly at proposition 4.01 and certain comments following it:

"A proposition is a picture of reality.
A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it." [4.01]

"At first sight a proposition--one set out on the printed page, for example--does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music . . . And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what they represent." [4.011]

"A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.
They are all construed according to a common logical pattern." [4.014]

So, Wittgenstein's basic view in the Tractatus is simple: statements ("propositions") are pictures or models of the situations they are about. The sequence of words "The cat is on the mat" would be taken by him to picture the situation that consists in one object (the cat) standing in a certain relation (being on) to another object (the mat). Or rather, this would be the way to understand this proposition if the cat and mat themselves were indivisible atoms, without any smaller parts. Since, actually, the cat is made up of a great many smaller parts, as is the mat, the full analysis of "The cat is on the mat" would be much more complicated. But basically, a proposition is a picture of the situation it describes just as the notes on a sheet of music depict a melody, and just as the written letters "pop" depict a certain sound. In breaking down the cat and the mat, we must eventually come to a point where things can't be broken down any further, with objects that are the basic constituents of reality. The relationships between these basic objects, which Wittgenstein just calls "objects", but which others have called "logical atoms", constitute the most elementary situations. These situations are described by what he calls "elementary propositions". Given a bunch of elementary propositions, we can combine and re-combine them by certain basic operations, called truth-functional operations, which are explained in any textbook of elementary formal logic. Two such operations are conjunction and negation. So, given three atoms, a, b, and c, and a relation R (R might be the relation "being on", as with the cat and the mat), we have, as elementary propositions, for instance:

aRb ("a is on b")
bRc ("b is on c")
aRc ("a is on c")

Then we can make new, compound propositions like

(aRb & bRc)
~aRc
(aRb & bRc) & ~aRc

Where "&" just means "and", as in "The cat is on the mat and the cherry is on the tree", and "~" means "It is not the case that", as in "It is not the case that the cat is on the mat". So the first of the above three compounds means "a is on b and b is on c", and the second means "It is not the case that a is on c", that is, a is not on c. You can easily work out the third one for yourself.

By means of operations like this (actually, Wittgenstein uses a different, but equivalent operation), one can build up an enormous stock of compound propositions. In fact, according to Wittgenstein, anything that can be said at all can be said by taking elementary propositions and applying operations like this repeatedly (albeit you might have to apply such operations infinitely, or to an infinite collection of propositions). Basically, then, given the simplest pictures of the world, we can stitch them together into more and more complicated pictures, and these yield all the statements and thoughts we can make, or at least all the ones that make any sense. Every meaningful statement ultimately breaks down to elementary propositions, propositions entirely in terms of simple signs or names (like "a" and "b") that stand for logical atoms. Everything that can be said meaningfully can, in principle, be broken down like this. This is the basic idea of logical atomism. Most of the technical work in this book consists of machinery for reducing all propositions of science and mathematics to combinations of elementary propositions. In the process, Wittgenstein shows you, he thinks, how to reduce claims with notions like "all" and "some" (like "All whales are mammals", "Some lawyers are crooks") and numerical claims ("There are four books on the shelf") to combinations of elementary propositions. If Wittgenstein succeeds in this, he considers himself to have shown that his "picture theory" of language is correct.

Okay, now you want to know, what's the *philosophical* point of all this? Well, for one thing, it means that anything you *can't* picture cannot be expressed by a meaningful proposition. If you try to speak of things that can't be pictured in Wittgenstein's way, you end up talking nonsense, in that what you are saying won't be true or false. Such utterances may express how you feel, or they may serve some other function (besides saying something) but they won't *say* anything that can be true (or false), and so there won't be any point in *arguing* about it. And what "things" are these, that you can't meaningfully talk about? The short answer is, all of traditional philosophy. Take ethics, for instance: "things" like right and wrong, or good and bad, can't be pictured, and so ethical "propositions" like "Murder is wrong" don't say anything. Maybe they express your feelings, or reflect some psychological fact, but they are not true or false. Likewise for religious claims that defy picturing, like "God is love" or "Brahman manifests itself in all things". Likewise for metaphysical claims about God or substance or causation or any underlying non-empirical reality. Likewise for epistemological worries about justification or rationality; these cannot be pictured in the requisite way either (hence Wittgenstein dismisses skepticism as nonsense). Wittgenstein's views of language are *so* restrictive that most of what philosophers have wanted to talk about turn out to fall into the category of the unspeakable, what he calls "the mystical". The mystical is what cannot be pictured, what is therefore beyond the realm of logic, reasoning, and articulate speech. About it, Wittgenstein claims, we cannot speak, and therefore we should be silent.

Oddly enough, Wittgenstein's own book turns out to be an attempt to talk about the mystical. For one of the things that cannot be pictured, is the very fact, as Wittgenstein takes it to be, that propositions are pictures of reality. (Think about it: how can you make a picture that says that propositions are pictures of reality? There's no way to do it along the lines of "The cat is on the mat", is there?) In fact, every attempt to talk about the relation between language and reality is itself an attempt to speak of the unspeakable, to attempt to characterize what can't be pictured. Wittgenstein recognizes this and responds thus:

"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." [6.54]

Wittgenstein's Tractatus itself, then, is a violation of his commandment to be silent in the face of the mystical. And once it is *recognized* as a violation, Wittgenstein hopes you will throw the book away and return to the ordinary, empirical world, free of any further desire to do philosophy, having gotten a clear vision of language and the world that makes it obvious to you that philosophy is a mistaken attempt to speak of the unspeakable. (You can now see why this book provokes bitter hostility in those who cherish traditional philosophy--after all, it says they're wasting their time!) But if so, how can Wittgenstein himself be right in writing the book? Isn't *it* a mistaken attempt to speak about the unspeakable? Yes and no. Yes, it *is* an attempt to say what can't be said--hence, once you understand it, paradoxically, you see that it's nonsense! But it is not a *mistaken* attempt, rather it is a self-conscious attempt, made necessary by our confusion and unclarity about the world while we are still enmeshed in the tangles of traditional philosophy. While that nonsense imprisons us, we cannot recognize it *as* nonsense, and as such, like mentally deranged people, we have to be approached *with* nonsense if we are to be cured--nonsense is all we respond to. So this book is a kind of curative "nonsense", like a purgative for the soul; it is meant to cleanse the mind of philosophical confusion (that is, of philosophy itself) and, at the end, to remove itself as the final piece of "confusion". To use a computer metaphor, the Tractatus is a program that wipes your whole philosophical "hard drive", and erases itself as its final operation. And after that final erasure, we return to the ordinary world, free of philosophy, in the deafening silence that is our acknowledgement of "das Mystiche"--the mystical in, and above, the ordinary.

5 out of 5 stars another perspective.......2005-12-13

a great work that should be read as a comprehensive attempt to elaborate a philosophical viewpoint that becomes, through this elaboration, no longer easily defensible.
Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius
Average customer rating: 4 out of 5 stars
  • Integrity and Introspection
  • Review: From the Bottom of My Heart
  • A thorough picture of both the man and his thought
  • No help
  • Brilliant biography and exposition
 Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius
Ray Monk
Manufacturer: Free Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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Customer Reviews:

5 out of 5 stars Integrity and Introspection.......2007-06-26

This is biography the way it should be written--focused on what made the subject important, and providing background context only to the degree necessary to situate people and events. Wittgenstein's temperament and personality were so inextricably bound up in his thought that any distinction evaporates. He thought like the person he was: ascetic, intuitive, and introverted. He questioned the value of his doing philosophy, as he questioned the value of his own thinking. His sense of duty was the obligation to speak the truth, no matter how awkward...or to be silent.

5 out of 5 stars Review: From the Bottom of My Heart.......2007-05-28

After reading this biography it suffices that I don't read any other.

5 out of 5 stars A thorough picture of both the man and his thought.......2007-02-07

I read this book because I had a very basic idea of LW's life and philosophy but really didn't feel that I understood them in any meaningful sense. I wasn't sure if my interest in either would withstand a 600 page biography, but thanks to both the author and the subject it was a pleasure to read.

The book is very thoroughly researched, with a ton of quoted material from Wittgenstein's letters and journals, much of it apparently not published elsewhere. This gives the book the considerable virtue of showing us what Wittgenstein was feeling/thinking rather than telling us (a distinction which LW would approve of).

The other thing I liked about it was that Monk gives us a thorough treatment (for a biography, that is) of his philosophical views and their evolution. The fact that the author comes from a philosophical background really helps here. He does an admirable job of placing many of Wittgenstein's difficult quotes and ideas into the larger context of his system of thought. Of course, I'm not knowledgeable enough to know whether Monk is wrong in any part of his interpretation, but if he happens to be, it's not because he doesn't know what he's talking about.

Overall, I thought the book had the perfect balance of biography and philosophical explanation. The philosophical parts were almost always linked with the portrait of Wittgenstein as a person, so they didn't weigh the book down or break up the narrative flow. Maybe the best way to sum things up is that although the book made Wittgenstein a lot less mysterious to me, I don't find him or his ideas any less fascinating after reading it.

2 out of 5 stars No help.......2005-04-13

I read the book but gained nothing as far as understanding Wittgenstein is concerned.

5 out of 5 stars Brilliant biography and exposition.......2005-03-12

Wittgenstein's philosophical writings are very difficult, not only in content but also in presentation. He was always unhappy about committing his ideas to paper, and when he did so, he would set them down in a highly compressed form as numbered notes, sometimes in the form of aphorisms. When he sent the manuscript of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, neither of these considerable intellects could understand it (which didn't stop Russell from writing a foreword when it was eventually published.)

The 650 pages of Monk's magnificent biography are of course anything but compressed, and allow us to understand how Wittgenstein arrived at his conclusions. Monk writes beautifully, and he sets out the intellectual processes with the utmost clarity; but an additional and very special merit of this book is the skilful interweaving of Wittgenstein's thought and his personality.

Wittgenstein was a tortured and difficult man: intense, introspective, uncompromising, ruthlessly honest with himself and with others. He was torn between his need for solitude and his need for philosophical discussion. There was within him an immense tension between logic and mysticism. He feared madness and was frequently uncertain about the value of philosophy: he gave it up altogether for a few years after the First World War and taught for six years at elementary schools in backward rural areas of Austria. In later life he was a practising but ashamed homosexual, and for this and other reasons often felt "indecent" and suicidal. He found friendship and even elementary courtesies difficult unless there was a total identity of philosophical ideals. But his charisma was such that a number of people were devoted to him, forgave his often savage moods and harsh outbursts, and helped him: transcribing his ideas; securing him a Fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1930 and a Professorship in 1939; giving him a home in his last illness.

Monk handles with particular skill the transition between Wittgenstein's two philosophies. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus laid down the foundations of what would become Logical Positivism, though Wittgenstein felt, from his first contact with the Vienna Logical Positivists, that his concerns were different from theirs. They were primarily concerned with the verification of propositions; but in the Tractatus Wittgenstein held that the only task for which philosophy was equipped was that of clarifying what we say by analyzing the language we use. This means examining the logical structure of language; but at the end of the process we have not said anything about the validity of the propositions that have been clarified. Whether a proposition is true or false is not ascertained by logical deductions but by whether it pictures the world as it actually is. Religious, ethical or aesthetic propositions cannot, said Wittgenstein, picture the world as it is, and it is therefore not possible for such topics to be meaningfully discussed. Therefore, in the famous last sentence of the Tractatus: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."

The Vienna School and the Logical Positivists were perfectly happy to have the realm of philosophy thus circumscribed; they felt no regret about the exclusion of religion and ethics from meaningful philosophical discourse. But Wittgenstein did suffer from this loss, and felt that the Vienna School had misunderstood him. He had already told his publishers that what the Tractatus did not contain was more important than what it did contain. He had to say more about those areas which he had felt forced to pass over in silence. Religious utterance could contain a truth and a meaning which did not depend on words having a very precise meaning, but on an understanding of how religious language is used; and this understanding is gained from the experience of living a religious life.

Indeed, in the posthumously published Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein shifted his attention from the relationship between meaning and truth to that between meaning and use. Language, in other words, is not a picture, but a tool; and it is the way we use it that shows the meaning we ascribe to it. "Don't ask for the meaning; ask for the use", Wittgenstein now proclaimed; that, he thought, would at last "showing the fly a way out of the fly-bottle." Though it is still descriptive rather than deductive, the task of philosophy is now to clarify the way words are used in different situations rather than to pin down the absolute meaning of a word to some unchanging fact in reality. To my mind it is a much richer and less arid philosophy than his earlier one; and Wittgenstein worked out all kinds of fascinating implications of his new insight: it enabled him to see how, for example, music or humour or body language can be meaningful discourse which can be understood once you know how those particular languages are being used. The second philosophy is also much easier to understand than his first - so much so, in fact, that Russell accused him of having "grown tired of serious thinking". It certainly resulted in building a bridge between the perceptions of the philosopher and the "common sense" perceptions of the ordinary man; and if in his earlier years it was the sheer abstruseness of his philosophy which made him doubt the value of what he was doing, he now worried about what at the end of the day might be the difference between philosophy and common sense. But in the end he did find a humble use for philosophy. He writes, "'What we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the synopsis of trivialities.' In philosophy we are not, like the scientist, building a house. Nor are we even laying the foundations of a house. We are merely 'tidying up a room'". (Monk, pp.298/299.)
Philosophical Investigations: 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition
Average customer rating: 4 out of 5 stars
  • The key text.
  • 3 stars only for 50th Anniversary edition
  • Nice Version of a Contemporary Classic
  • A fine book
  • Grossly Overrated
 Philosophical Investigations: 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition
Ludwig Wittgenstein , G. E. M. Anscombe , and Elizabeth Anscombe
Manufacturer: Blackwell Publishing, Incorporated
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ASIN: 0631231277

Book Description

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations presents his own distillation of two decades of intense work on the philosophies of mind, language and meaning. When first published in 1953, it immediately entered the centre of philosophical debate, and achieved a classic status it has retained ever since.

This revised German&ndash;English edition is published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death. It incorporates final revisions by G. E. M. Anscombe (1919&ndash;2001) to her original English translation.

.

Customer Reviews:

5 out of 5 stars The key text........2007-01-19

Thisd just is the key text of 20th century philosophy. Written in aphoristic style and heavily reactive to the conversation between Frege Russell and the early Wittgenstein that gave birth to contemporary analytic philosophy it is a must read (in company with some of the texts from those three authors). Nobody should remain unchanged in their thinking by reading and striving to understand this work.

3 out of 5 stars 3 stars only for 50th Anniversary edition.......2006-10-11

Just a few comments on this 50th anniversary--supposedly FINAL--edition of the translation:
1) After 50 years Anscombe STILL did not fix the snafu in section 412 where she forgot to translate a parenthetical. She was informed of this in the 1950's!
2) To change the translation of "Lebensform" from "form of life" to "life-form" after all these years is unnecessary and stupid. It rings too much of biology and Star Trek.
3) To change the pagination, by which all references to Part II and inserts to Part I have been made for 50 years, is an unnecessary bother.
4) The translation has NEWLY-INTRODUCED typos in sections 38, 41, 47, and then I stopped counting. How is this an improvement?
Please bring the older editions back in print!

4 out of 5 stars Nice Version of a Contemporary Classic.......2006-07-30

Originally published in 1953 the `Philosophical Investigations' was the latter of Wittgenstein's two influential philosophical texts (the Tractatus being the offer). This Fiftieth Anniversary edition provides the original German text and Anscombe's English translation on opposing pages.

The Investigations is widely considered to be one of the most influential philosophical texts of the last century. Although it touches on a range of issues including logic and philosophy of the mind it is largely focused on issues pertaining to the philosophy of language. That said, I share the view that Wittgenstein is difficult to categorize - in many ways he stands outside the mainstream of philosophy.

I have occasionally heard it said that Wittgenstein is appealing and accessible to non-philosophers. Undoubtedly this will vary from reader to reader, however, I think a good understanding of the philosophical questions of the time is essential to getting the most out of Wittgenstein - he spends little time framing the issues under discussion and without this background many of his musings may seem meaningless.

From a historic perspective this is one of the most important works in twentieth century philosophy, on a more basic level it is a choppy and poorly constructed work. I struggle with Wittgenstein, sometimes viewing him as trivial other times as profound. Clearly, many great thinkers are in the latter camp, as are ironically many neophytes who want to appear as if they understand Wittgenstein.

Overall, this is an excellent edition of a modern day classic - an essential addition to any serous student's library. I would not, however, recommend this as an entry point to the world of philosophy.

5 out of 5 stars A fine book.......2006-04-10

This is one of the greatest books I have ever read--and I've read quite a few books.

3 out of 5 stars Grossly Overrated.......2006-02-27

B. Marnold gives an excellent review. I agree that Wittgenstein is the most "seminal" philosopher of the 20th C., but I disagree with the view that he's the most important. Unlike Marnold, I like Moore. I think he's underestimated. His "Principia" is extraordinary. My own favorite philosopher is Karl Popper. So this review is deliberately contrarian.

Wittgenstein is very difficult to understand, with which everyone agrees. His best exegete is David Stern, who has studied LW for decades and written the best overview of his philosophy. And, once you see what LW seems to write, much of it isn't very significant.

Yes, "language games," "private language," "family resemblance," "use determines meaning," and other LW phrases have entered the academic parlor game. But even those who use LW don't agree with what LW meant. The problem is obvious. Aphorisms are quaint, but they are difficult to distill into an argument (ditto: Nietzsche), simply because there aren't any. By reading LW one is supposed to have "eureka" or "insights." Well, by golly, everyone has, but they they don't all seem to agree. Wonder why? If LW's point was that language is polysemous, well the medievalist knew that centuries ago. The clash between nominalism and essentialism (family resemblances) goes back to the thirteenth century (Occham/Aquinas), if not before. If language is stable/unstable, you can get better arguments from Saul Kripke and I. A. Richards than you can from LW. If you see a pattern here (and I hope you do), the problems that concerned LW go back centuries, but at least back then, they spoke coherently and argued intelligently about the claims they were making. LW's aphorisms lead to all kinds of equivocation, which is precisely what he was trying to avoid (we think).

If that's not confusing enough, LW had a "Pauline on the way to Damascus" conversion between co-writing the Tractatus and the Investigations. Everyone agrees there's a wide difference, but over what they cannot pin down. The Tractatus is arcane and obscure, but patient (believe me) reading and reflection reveals the semblance of an argument (in philosophy's use). The Investigations, on the other hand, require a Brahman; does this belong to that, or is it a part of this over here? Even the most astute scholars don't agree. So where does that leave us?

Yes (II), language was the preoccupation of the 20th C. And honestly, we've learned a lot. It all started with LW, so for that we're all grateful. Some "seminal" philosophers of the 20th C. are indebted to LW's linguistic turn, e.g., Austin, Ayer, Russell, Ryle, Searle, Putnam, Taylor, Rorty, Gadamer, Ricouer, et alia. Yet I think English philosopher Roger Scruton makes the convincing point that German philosopher Gotlieb Frege was more instrumental in that focus than LW. And, Frege, while challenging, is intelligible.

Philosophy often asks the arcane, difficult, and opaque questions that concern all of us. Unfortunately, as challenging as those questions are--and they are challenging, the last thing philosophers need is someone who is unintelligible himself. It's difficult enough to try to "wrap yourself around" a particular issue, even when the person is writing coherently, so why have people gravitated to LW (another case is Jacques Derrida), in which convolution and opacity are the hallmarks? Frankly, I think it is an intelligentsia embargo. If YOU can't understand what we're doing, how dare you question what it is that we do? (Reply:) Simply because no one understands.

Difficult thought can be difficult. Even David Hume, the most accessible English-speaking philosopher of all time, has widely different exegetes. Which proves the point. So why invest in an author whose aphorisms continue to confuse, rather than in writers who write plain English. And if philosophy is your game, as it is mine, then write in coherent arguments. You know: If a is B, and B is C, then A is C (that's Aristotle's syllogism, for those who don't know). Boolean logic has largely replaced Aristotle's, but the same general concept applies. Why would a computer programmer, for example, write a software program that her hardware couldn't understand? We are the hardware, and LW as software doesn't seem to get us very far.

If one is really interested in the philosophy of language (which frankly I find boring), Frege and Austin are the writers to read. But if your "game" is chess without a board, then maybe LW will titillate your neurons.
The Wittgenstein Reader (Blackwell Readers)
Average customer rating: 5 out of 5 stars
  • Great text for doing philosophy in class
  • Mr from Mumbai,
  • A handy access to Wittgenstein's works (themewise sorted)
  • An excellent compilation by an excellent author
 The Wittgenstein Reader (Blackwell Readers)

Manufacturer: Blackwell Publishing Professional
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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  1. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (Routledge Classics)
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ASIN: 0631193626

Book Description

This volume is the first selection of the key writings of Wittgenstein - arguably the emblematic philosopher of the twentieth-century. Assembled for students, The Wittgenstein Reader represents the breadth, complexity, and evolution of Wittgenstein's work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - which set his philosophical agenda - to the later work on ethics and religion.This thematic selection corresponds roughly to the chronological development of Wittgenstein's philosophical interests, beginning with The Rejection of Logical Atomism through to Ethics, Life and Faith. Taken together, the selections are designed to add up to an overview of Wittgenstein's philosophical position, making The Wittgenstein Reader an ideal single text for course use.

Customer Reviews:

5 out of 5 stars Great text for doing philosophy in class.......2005-05-20

For those that wish to use Wittgenstein to engage students with philosophy this book is a great way to do that without having to purchase several more expensive books. This selection of the key writings presents the evolution of Wittgenstein from the Tractatus to his later works. It enables students to experience doing philosophy and moving from one stage to another and another in a practical way. It corresponds well to reflective thinking stages and helps demonstrate the philosophical succession that leads to our contemporary position on truth, beauty and goodness. I agree that "Taken together, the selections are designed to add up to an overview of Wittgenstein's philosophical position, making The Wittgenstein Reader an ideal single text for course use."

5 out of 5 stars Mr from Mumbai,.......2003-08-10

"The Wolrd is the totality of facts, not of things. Not how the world is mystical, but that it is. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. And this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. So if you want to stay within the religious sphere you must struggle."

I qoute this phrase from your review; it was totally misunderstanding of yours. Your review will mislead the future readers of this amazing piece by Anthony Kenny.

If someone want to read Anthony's book, I strongly recommend his book about Aquinas. His English is really awesome: it was concise, powerful, and beautiful! not for americans tho'

5 out of 5 stars A handy access to Wittgenstein's works (themewise sorted).......2000-07-01

A very good introduction to Wittgenstein's works. Given the fact that Wittgenstein did not write in usual essay form and did not encourage publications of his works in his life time, the book is very good contribution to the context of Wittgenstein's readers. An abridgement of the Tractatus is given as first chapter. A good balance of thematically and chronological basis has been adopted in the sequence of other chapters. The sample chapter titles are : The Rejection of Logical Atomism , Meaning and Understanding,... The First Person, .. The Nature of Philosophy, Ethics,Life and Faith. A good index is provided. Two weaknesses are : The author provides a two-page introduction. A 10 page biography would have been proper . Also a last chapter which summaries the nature of Wittgenstein's works and its relation to other philosophical works would have been better. From the point of view of Wittgenstein's scholars, the remarks are provided without any citation numbering. It complicates refering the book. Same sample Wittgenstein's remarks: The Wolrd is the totality of facts, not of things. Not how the world is mystical, but that it is. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. And this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. So if you want to stay within the religious sphere you must struggle.

5 out of 5 stars An excellent compilation by an excellent author.......2000-04-18

I myself am not a die-hard fan of epistemology. In fact, the only works dedicated to that topic which I can stand for long are written by Anthony Kenny. He does wonders with Wittegnstein. His commentary and selections truly make the philosophy come to life. Even if you aren't particularly fond of the material, it still proves to be a highly valuable and highly readable work.
Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)
Average customer rating: 4 out of 5 stars
  • Excellent introduction to Wittgenstein
  • Love the Wittgy, hate the Grayling.
  • A gem!
  • Clearly written and critically sound
  • Overbite
 Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)
A. C. Grayling
Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0192854119

Book Description

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an extraordinarily original philospher, whose influence on twentieth-century thinking goes well beyond philosophy itself. In this book, which aims to make Wittgenstein's thought accessible to the general non-specialist reader, A. C. Grayling explains the nature and impact of Wittgenstein's views. He describes both his early and later philosophy, the differences and connections between them, and gives a fresh assessment of Wittgenstein's continuing influence on contemporary thought.

Customer Reviews:

5 out of 5 stars Excellent introduction to Wittgenstein.......2007-06-05

This is an ideal overview of Wittgenstein for those looking to get an initial grasp on his work. Grayling's style is admirably clear and accessible, which is especially valuable because the writing of Wittgenstein himself can be notoriously difficult and cryptic. The book provides a well-organized, concise summary of the Wittgenstein's two philosophic periods (earlier and later). While you might feel a little lost or confused when Grayling is explaining Wittgenstein's writings, don't worry -- at the end of tbe summaries of both periods Grayling offers critical analyses where he reveals that he is also confused by some things, and in his analyses he will probably address many of the questions you have. While this book isn't easy, and a little philosophic background would probably be helpful, given the diffculty of the subject matter you can't really expect it to be much easier. Highly recommended -- would that there was an intro of this quality for every philosopher.

3 out of 5 stars Love the Wittgy, hate the Grayling........2007-01-03

I love the VSI series, but this volume was a bit of a disappointment. Mr. Grayling is very repetitive, and I do not agree with his critique of Wittgentein's later philosophy. Furthermore, he claims that it has had little influence on today's philosophy, which just seems completely false to me. The naturalization of epistemology is completely in accord with Wittgenstein's ideas, Kuhn's 'paradigms' are a version of Wittgenstein's 'forms of life', not to mention the current emphasis on practices. If Wittgenstein is not an influential figure in today's philosophy, Mr. Grayling, then who do you think is??

5 out of 5 stars A gem!.......2006-07-23

This book is astounding! I have never before encountered a short introduction that so clearly, concisely, accurately or effectively communicates a complex and largely obscure subject. As a result, this book is a remarkable achievement in its own right, not only illuminating the mysteries of Wittgenstein's very difficult work, but doing so in a way that will serve as a timeless model of successful communication. That is not to say that this book is `easy' or that Wittgenstein's complex ideas have been made simple. I only say that the author has presented those ideas in ways that put them within the reach of intelligent readers who are prepared to work in exchange for a very gratifying intellectual return. With Grayling as a guide, Wittgenstein is accessible! Incredible!

4 out of 5 stars Clearly written and critically sound.......2006-05-28

Grayling's introduction to Wittgenstein's early and later works is by far the most critical, when comparing the piece to other recent introductory attempts by other qualified writers. Generally, the author does an exceptional job, as was his stated intention, at writing this "introduction" for an uninformed audience, one with little or no knowledge of Wittgenstein or philosophy in general.

The overall tone of the writing is one of scepticism, a serious doubt as to Wittgenstein's importance in terms of his contribution to 20th century philosophy. Considering the space provided, Grayling's argument(s) are thorough and persuasive in parts, however his attempt at objectivity, to then give the reader incentive to continue investigation into the subject, can be questioned, (if objectivity was actually his aim) as the reader comes away believing Wittgenstein to be more of a poet, a creative designer of witty aphorisms than a serious philosopher, as his concluding remarks make quite clear:

"But I find that when one advances beyond the manner and reflects on the content, the irresistible feeling is this: that the journey through Wittgenstein's circuitous, metaphorical, sometimes opaque negations and suggestions is long; but the distance it takes is a short." (P. 134)

In other words, when the reader wades through Wittgenstein's unnecessary symbolism, witty metaphors and dense, unpacked arguments, the actual content is not as profound as we were first led believe. All in all, though, Grayling believes the Austrian to be one of the great "personalities" of philosophy, but as a philosopher, will be soon forgotten: however, as he states, time will tell.

Having said that, Grayling is an excellent writer having to distil a body of complex work that has been analysed and debated for over half a century.

Wittgenstein's first major work, the `Tractatus', a notorious complex thesis, was summarized and explained clearly, even including a short lesson on basic logic, making the work much easier to grasp. The later philosophy, `Philosophical Investigations' and others, which include the philosopher's notions of private language, language-games, use and rules, shed light on these concepts.

Graylings arguments on cultural and cognitive relativism were exceptionally clear and interesting, arguing against Wittgenstein's "form of life" concepts. Unfortunately these arguments needed elaboration, but the author was under severe space constraints.

An excellent introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy and overall, critically sound.


2 out of 5 stars Overbite.......2005-11-02

Unfortunately, Grayling's Very Short Introduction succumbs to a pitfall typical of a very short introduction. Put simply: despite all the well-known risks of the genre, the author can't resist biting off more than the small chewing space of 132 pages can accomodate. The first 100 or so pages are informative enough, providing appropriate highlights of Wittgenstein's life and work. Of course, a lot gets unavoidably left out. Still, the contours come through with sufficient clarity to provide a good rudimentary understanding, though I wish he had pointed out more emphatically the critical nature of both phases -- how each in its own way draws bounds on what can and cannot be meaningfully stated. For it's here, I believe, that the general reader would find the Austrian thinker's conclusions most relevant to her own concerns.

The problem arises, not surprisingly, when the text turns from exposition to evaluation. To present the private language argument, as Grayling does, as inherently inconsistent or the form-of-life argument as a variety of cognitive relativism simply requires more than several pages of potted reasoning, to say the least. In fact, these are complex and controversial topics about which entire volumes have been written. To be sure, I don't object to pointing out avenues of criticism even in a very short account; I do however object to the assurance with which these objections are presented here. For such confidence goes quite beyond what the book's brief compass can support and therewith does a disservice to the unwary reader. Moreover, in assessing the Austrian phiosopher's influence, one key facet of his later thought should be kept in mind. The point of doing philosophy is to let the fly out of the bottle, not to entrap further generations in ever-more futile buzzing around the so-called perenial problems that have beguiled thinkers for centuries. In that sense, Wittgenstein's method presents an anti-institutional thrust: it seeks to dissolve problems, not perpetuate them. Thus his way conflicts at a pretty basic level with the institutional interests of academic philosophy which depend to a great extent on perpetuating those perennial problems. Is it therefore surprising that his therapeutic approach has found little favor among philosophy departments, whatever the ultimate merits. I don't claim this sociological point as exhaustive, but I do think it's an undernoted factor in the general blunting of his legacy.

Anyway, this slim volume comes as a disappoitment given Grayling's previous works, while there are a number of general intoductions that deal more sensitively with Wittgenstein's later work than this one.

Pragmatism: An Open Question
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    		Pragmatism: An Open Question
    Hilary Putnam
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    ASIN: 063119343X

    Book Description

    Hilary Putnam has been at the center of contemporary debates about the nature of the mind and of its access to the world, about language and its relation to reality, and many other metaphysical and epistemological issues. In this book he turns to pragmatism - and confronts the teachings of James, Peirce, Dewey, and Wittgenstein - not solely out of an interest in theoretical questions, but above all to respond to the questions of whether it is possible to find an alternative to corrosive moral skepticism, on the one hand, and to moral authoritarianism on the other.
    Philosophical Grammar
    Average customer rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    • the limits of language
    • Typical philosophy
    • philosophical grammar
    		 Philosophical Grammar
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
    Manufacturer: University of California Press
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    1. Zettel
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    ASIN: 0520037251

    Book Description

    In 1933 Ludwig Wittgenstein revised a manuscript he had compiled from his 1930-1932 notebooks, but the work as a whole was not published until 1969, as Philosophische Grammatik. This first English translation clearly reveals the central place Philosophical Grammar occupies in Wittgenstein's thought and provides a link from his earlier philosophy to his later views.

    Customer Reviews:

    4 out of 5 stars the limits of language.......2004-07-26

    certain other reviewers of this book may have missed the point. Not that it isn't okay to miss the point from time to time, Sometimes it's a good thing to miss the point, but its not very useful in a book review. The short reason as to why this book is worth reading is because it was edited by Rush Rhees who has a different point of view on Wittgenstein than many of his other literary executors which is worth being exposed to. The mid-sized reason is that this is "Middle Period" Wittgenstein, and it is interesting to watch a great mind question itself in the way that Wittgenstein is beginning to do here. The long reason is that there are ideas here that are referenced in the Late Wittgenstein and which shed light on the ideas Wittgenstein comes to in On Certainty, Philosophical Investigations, and Zettel.

    So in short, pay no attention to reviewers who lack the background to understand what this book is for, or who don't know how to read a book like this. If you've not yet been exposed to Wittgenstein, don't start here. Read Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty first. Read the Blue and Brown Books. Browse through Zettel and Philosophical Remarks. Those all contain a more cohesive picture of the man's thought. For people with some background on Wittgenstein looking for more to ponder, well, that's what I got from this book. And it's valuable.

    3 out of 5 stars Typical philosophy.......2004-01-01

    Once feature of this book that is always fascinating is that one can take any paragraph in it and generate a plethora of ideas and commentary, that might even fill volumes. This book is not unique in that regard, but in fact most books of philosophy have this characteristic. They allow the mind to go forth untamed and engage in speculations that are unconstrained by experience or laboratory experiments. Philosophical reasoning is to be distinguished therefore by its freedom to say and write what it pleases, unlike the case for scientific reasoning, which is highly constrained by observation and experiment. There are some interesting points made in this book, some of them having intersection with what is now going on in artificial intelligence, computational grammar, and linguistics. Readers can also gain insight into the school of logical atomism, which the author was of course very much a part of.

    The book is organized as a collection of disjointed paragraphs, which little or no correlation between them. Many of them are quite interesting and thought-provoking, especially if read in the context of the field of artificial intelligence. It is doubtful though that any of these ideas could be refined in such a way as to make them useful in the goal of building thinking machines. They are just too loosely structured to be codified in a language that would run on a machine. Speculative ideas unfortunately are like that. The ideas in the book might perhaps though put one in a certain frame of mind that would permit more acceptance of various claims made in artificial intelligence. Conversely, it might very well increase the doubt on those claims. Such is the nature of philosophical grammar: its expressive power and rich information content permits a wide range of interpretations.

    5 out of 5 stars philosophical grammar.......2001-12-30

    like all his works logic is the most remarkable issue
    Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers
    Average customer rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    • MORAL RULE: Thou shall not threaten visiting lecturers with fireplace pokers
    • Decent biographical coverage but very inadequete handling of the underlying philosophy
    • A book of personalities
    • For real!
    • A Balanced account of a very interesting event
    		 Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers
    David Edmonds , and John Eidinow
    Manufacturer: Harper Perennial
    ProductGroup: Book
    Binding: Paperback

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    5. On Certainty

    ASIN: 0060936649
    Release Date: 2002-09-17

    Book Description

    On October 25, 1946, in a crowded room in Cambridge, England, the great twentieth-century philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper came face to face for the first and only time. The meeting -- which lasted ten minutes -- did not go well. Their loud and aggressive confrontation became the stuff of instant legend, but precisely what happened during that brief confrontation remained for decades the subject of intense disagreement.

    An engaging mix of philosophy, history, biography, and literary detection, Wittgenstein's Poker explores, through the Popper/Wittgenstein confrontation, the history of philosophy in the twentieth century. It evokes the tumult of fin-de-siécle Vienna, Wittgentein's and Popper's birthplace; the tragedy of the Nazi takeover of Austria; and postwar Cambridge University, with its eccentric set of philosophy dons, including Bertrand Russell. At the center of the story stand the two giants of philosophy themselves -- proud, irascible, larger than life -- and spoiling for a fight.

    Customer Reviews:

    5 out of 5 stars MORAL RULE: Thou shall not threaten visiting lecturers with fireplace pokers.......2007-05-20

    XXXXX

    "Take a dispute fundamental to philosophy, for whose future both [exceptional] men felt personal responsibility; take the cultural, social, and political differences between [these two men]; take the obsession of one with the other, who is in turn totally self-absorbed; take their no-holds-barred style of communication; take their complex relationship with their father figure, Russell--throw all these into the caldron that was H3 and a major explosion seems to have been inevitable. The poker becomes only a fuse."

    The above is found near the end of this fascinating book authored by award-winning BBC journalists David Edmonds and John Eidinow. This book has been published in over a dozen languages.

    This book hinges on one small ambiguous bite-sized brouhaha that occurred in October 1946 in room H3 located in King's College (a part of Cambridge University in England). Two prominent names of 20TH century philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 to 1951) and Karl Popper (1902 to 1994) debated one another for the first and only time. (The debate was mediated by yet another prominent name in philosophy, Bertrand Russell {1872 to 1970}.) Their encounter lasted only ten minutes and, as you can surmise from the above quotation, did not go so well. Almost immediately, rumors began to spread globally and one version of the story suggested that these two had come to blows, armed with red-hot fireplace pokers.

    Be aware that this is not a philosophy book even though it does contain some philosophy. The poker incident is used as a starting point or "springboard" for investigating all of the important historical events particularly in Vienna and Cambridge that shaped this incident. In other words, this story is presented in a very roundabout way, circling back to the poker incident while examining all that needs to be taken into account in fully understanding what transpired. (Some readers may not like this roundabout approach.)

    As well, there is good and significant biographical detail given of Wittgenstein and Popper. One chapter is devoted to discussing Russell, "the third man" in this story.

    This is a well-written book that's engaging and accessible with some humorous spots---a delight to read even if you're a non-philosopher. I found that I learned a lot, painlessly, without even noticing.

    This is a surprisingly well-researched book. Information was gathered not just from books but from interviews & correspondence including eyewitnesses and those who knew one or both of these two philosophers. These people "gave their time to search their memories, offer their recollections and furnish us [the authors] with background information" and "invaluable help."

    Finally, there are more than twenty illustrations in the middle of this book in the form of black and white photographs or "plates." I found that these enhanced the book's readability and enjoyment.

    In conclusion, the authors of this book "make the meeting of Popper and Wittgenstein seem as fateful as that between the iceberg and the Titanic." An interesting and enjoyable read!!

    (first published 2001; 23 chapters; main narrative 295 pages; Appendices: (1) chronology (of the lives of Wittgenstein and Popper) (2) "Times" literary supplement letters (where several witnesses address the poker incident); acknowledgments; sources; index)

    XXXXX

    3 out of 5 stars Decent biographical coverage but very inadequete handling of the underlying philosophy.......2007-01-04

    Nearly no insight into the actual philosophical differences that the two protagonists had. Tries to be biographical and the authors try to make feeble attempts at trying to convince that all they had were historical differences. Shows clearly that the writers are journalists and their hold over the philosophical underpinnings is negligible. A waste of time if you are looking for philosophical insights. If you are looking for a semi-biographical account of the lives of these two great philosophers, there are other books out there which serve the purpose better. In the end, it is an attempt to sensationalize what in my opinion was a minor event and comes across as quite contrived.

    4 out of 5 stars A book of personalities.......2006-12-04

    A student of philosophy will find this book interesting for its descriptions of prominent personalities (including Russell), but this book does not contain any particularly profound discussions of philosophy. The ideas of both Wittgenstein and Popper are given a shallow explanations; in addition the basic ideas of some other philosophical schools that came and went are discussed. However, the lives of these men are interesting, and the the author's commentary on the historical importance of the ideas of these men is also interesting. In addition this book gives Wittgenstein fans some helpful information on the evolution of Wittgenstein's ideas that may not be apparent from the paucity of documents that comprise Wittgenstein's writings.

    5 out of 5 stars For real!.......2006-08-25

    I can't think of a better technique to "smarty-pants" your way through a game of Texas Hold 'Em than what's outlined here. Let's just hope the rumors that Edmonds and Eidinow are finishing up their draft of "Spinoza's Three Card Monte" aren't simply the liquor talking.

    4 out of 5 stars A Balanced account of a very interesting event.......2006-07-26

    It is the story of an infamous confrontation in 1946 between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. Clearly this is not the sort of book you are likely to pick up unless you are interested in the history of modern philosophy. The book attracted my eye because I had recently read Popper's autobiography, The Unended Quest.

    As a fan of Popper, I might be inclined to share his view that Wittgenstein was one of the enemies of philosophy. However, this is a very balanced account of how these two Vienese natives came to have such opposing views. Basically, Popper argued that not only were philosophical problems still important, but that they were what made it worth doing. In contrast, as one of the giants of linguistic analysis, Wittgenstein argued that there were no valid philosophical problems, only puzzles of lanquage.

    Many non-professional phiosophers would share Popper's opinion that this is exactly were philosophy went astray and became non-relevent to the real world.

    Even if you know nothing about philosophy this is a highly readable account of an unusual event and an excellent introduction to how both made important contributions to modern thought.
    The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy
    Average customer rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars
    • Can I ever know what he really thinks?
    • Living our skepticism
    • The Claim of Reason
    • The belles lettres tradition at its best
    • Cavell's Opus
    		 The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy
    Stanley Cavell
    Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
    ProductGroup: Book
    Binding: Paperback

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    5. Philosophical Investigations: 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition

    ASIN: 019513107X

    Book Description

    This reissue of an American philosophical classic includes a new preface by Cavell, in which he discusses the work's reception and influence. The work fosters a fascinating relationship between philosophy and literature both by augmenting his philosophical discussions with examples from literature and by applying philosophical theories to literary texts. Cavell also succeeds in drawing some very important parallels between the British analytic tradition and the continental tradition, by comparing skepticism as understood in Descartes, Hume, and Kant with philosophy of language as practiced by Wittgenstein and Austin.

    Customer Reviews:

    5 out of 5 stars Can I ever know what he really thinks?.......2004-06-06

    In an episode of a popular TV series, a female character tired of the obscurity in her relationship complains to her partner that, even though she can see his lips moving as he speaks, she can never know what he is really thinking. What is it that she is accusing him of, and is her complaint necessarily melodramatic? Stanley Cavell's long, difficult book on scepticisim and our knowledge of other people would be an excellent guide in considering this question and assessing its source in the dialogue as a philosophical text.

    One answer might be that, to her mind, he is strenuously trying to hide something from her, with the result that the way he speaks draws her attention primarily to his efforts in stopping himself from saying what he would say spontaneously if it wasn't for the strain of attempted secrecy. Instead of simply attending to him as usual, without any interpretation, she finds herself inferring, from all kinds of bodily clues, that he is deliberately denying her access to his thoughts and feelings. If he wasn't trying to be so secretive and deceitful, she would see straightaway that his words were somehow aligned with his thoughts, and would have no reason to accuse him of wanting to mislead her. On this reading, there is nothing particularly melodramatic about the situation at hand - it is all just an ordinary anxiety about a lover's desire to avoid transparency.

    But there might also be a second answer: she has lost all confidence in his words and actions ever revealing his thoughts. It isn't just that his face communicates something about him that she finds incompatible with what he is saying about his love for her; rather, it is that nothing he ever does could give her any reliable clues as to what goes on inside him: his mind and heart remain forever sealed off from her by his body. No matter what he says or does, none of these things ever express what she really wants to know - he is closed in on himself, inaccessible to her precisely where she would want most intimacy with him. Now this is an evidently melodramatic reading: it goes beyond the situation as described and precludes any chance of success for the lovers - it is not because of anything he does deliberately that he is hidden from her, it is just how human beings are doomed to relate to each other in mutual ignorance. But is it a real worry for anyone?

    Stanley Cavell's book falls into four interconnected parts. The first part discusses the notion of a criterion - what is involved in saying that a given thing is called this or that, and how that sort of claim differs from saying that it is a real specimen of a particular kind. Cavell's guide here is the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations, and it is worth noting here how one person's thinking and writing can be an inexhaustible source of wonder and inspiration for another without turning them into a mere epigone. The second part concerns the idea that our fundamental relation to the world is one of knowledge - a view that holds a deep fascination for the philosopher but is nevertheless questioned as untrue to how human beings relate to things in the world. The third part concentrates on the place of rules in morality, whereas the fourth is a collection of essays, with rather unclear boundaries, on the temptation to think that our fellow human beings are not really human. A self-reflective book easy to get lost in - in more than one way.

    5 out of 5 stars Living our skepticism.......2003-12-13

    The entirety of Cavell's work arranges itself around _The Claim of Reason_, a 564pp book that was extraordinarily long in its gestation (over two decades), as it grew out of his thesis on Wittgenstein into a much stranger shape. In Cavell's inimitable self-citing way, since its publication he's rarely written anything that doesn't refer back to _The Claim of Reason_.

    I'm not going to summarize it here. Its basic burden ("burden" is a word Cavell likes to use--think of it in both senses, as both "weight" & "refrain") is an effort to grapple with the Western epistemological tradition, & to suggest that it contains a major blind spot. Post-Cartesian philosophy has been preoccupied with skepticism about the possibility of proving the accuracy of our knowledge about or, or even the existence of, the material world. Cavell is interested in this skepticism for two reasons: (1) its ultimate unanswerability; (2) the curious evanescence of its conclusions: as Hume notes, once one leaves the study & goes out into the real world of social interaction & daily concerns, the skeptical conclusion evaporates, looks "cold & strained". Cavell then traces out another kind of skepticism: the problem of the existence of other minds, or more generally the question of our knowledge of others. In Cavell's view, other-minds skepticism "makes sense" in a way that material-world skepticism does not: or rather, it is "live" in our everyday interactions (it's not news to anyone that we have only glimpses of the inner being of others). In other words, with the problem of other minds, "we live our skepticism" (the four-word formula which the entire book builds up to).

    This is a neat opposition which Cavell admits is itself somewhat unstable. But it leads him to suggest that the history of Western & in particular post-Cartesian philosophy has been a history of ignoring the problem of the other; for Cavell it is a concern that has been instead most deeply grappled with in literature. The book concludes with a sketch of four of what he takes to be the most fruitful ways philosophy could develop a history of the problem of the other; & with readings of _The Merchant of Venice_, _The Winter's Tale_ & (in particular) _Othello_ as dramas of other-minds skepticism.

    As you'll see I've approached the book, so to speak, from the back-end: it takes quite some time before these larger themes are fully set forth. The opening sections take on several different thinkers (Rawls, Austin) but are largely an exposition of Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein's _Philosophical Investigations_. The key move here is his case that Wittgenstein's notion of "criteria" has been misunderstood by most of Wittgenstein's readers: Cavell (to my mind persuasively) argues that Wittgenstein did not conceive of criteria as criteria for (proof of) something's _existence_; but that instead they are criteria of _meaning_: of what makes something "count as", identifiable as something.

    This is the kind of book which is, simply, too full for any single reading: it's as much a sourcebook as it is a sustained argument, & I can see why Cavell continues to use it as such. There are elements I wish he had extended further. For instance, I find myself desiring that Cavell had taken time to spell out, not just the distinction/interrelation between material-world skepticism & other-minds skepticism, but also between material-world skepticism & scientific knowledge & practice, as forms of thinking that both contradict what we "know" about the world in everyday life. (What I'm getting at is: in the "skeptical recital", as Cavell puts it, the exchange runs something like: "How do you know this envelope on this table exists?" "By means of my senses." Then: "But could you not be deceived by a clever trickster? "Couldn't you be hallucinating or dreaming?" or "But you can't see the _other_ side of the envelope." &c. But what if instead the speaker pointed out the disparity between the data give by the senses, & the way that the world is conceived of in the modern atomic theory for instance? What distinguishes this kind of cognitive dissonance from skepticism?) This is not a criticism, exactly--obvious Cavell has different fish to fry--but it seems an odd omission given the book's interest in Romanticism, which on my understanding is in part a response to science's disenchantment of the world (Keats complaining about optical science's ruining the charm of the rainbow, &c). Cavell's discussion of our disappointment with knowledge would have been richer, I think, if it had touched on this other area.

    A last word on the style of the book, which I might describe as "companionable". The book is not without its miry spots, but on the whole it's an enjoyable, rather friendly read, with a lot of interesting eddies of internal dialogue (like Wittgenstein, Cavell likes to introduce imaginary interlocutors). The more tortuous (Henry) Jamesian style of later Cavell is only rarely in evidence, perhaps because so much of the book derives from his early dissertation (though obviously extensively reworked). For all the sheer unruliness of the book's structure, it's the kind of book that stays with you, a touchstone & resource.

    5 out of 5 stars The Claim of Reason.......2002-12-11

    Professor Cavell's exploration of Wittgenstein's writings, skepticism and the drama of tragedy is itself a long journey for the reader. I think that the philosophic re-enactman of Wiggenstein's philosophical thoughts, and the analysis of skepticism as a theme of tragedy of the doubting self may elude the non-philosophic reader, but once the reader gets it, it is worth these few hundreds of pages.

    4 out of 5 stars The belles lettres tradition at its best.......2002-08-11

    I recommend this book to anyone who, like me, is in love with ideas but cannot figure out why anyone would bother to read the dry, technical, specialized prose of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy OR the windy, pseudo-profound, obscurantist convolutions of European postmodernism. I came to this book from Cavell's brilliant volume on screwball comedy, "Pursuits of Happiness," which treated Golden Age American cinema with the
    intellectual and aesthetic seriousness it deserves without ever
    straying from an essential love of the films. "The Claim of Reason" was a difficult read (I was 20 when I read it and had never read an entire book of philosophy): Cavell can be windy and obscurantist himself, yet there is also something beguilingly sensual about his prose (a little like Henry James), and even when one is not the least bit sure that one fully understands him, one is inexorably led on because the book, unlike any other modern philosophy I am aware of, treats philosophical problems as though they have meaning for the deepest concerns of one's daily life, and vice versa. Cavell also, throughout his writings, treats morality as being of urgent concern, without ever relying on platitudes...

    5 out of 5 stars Cavell's Opus.......2001-06-07

    Despite "long sentences," this book is an essential and personal Auseinandersetzung with philosophical issues ranging from Skepticism (of the world, of other minds), rule-following, common-sense knowledge, ordinary language philosophy, essentialism, foundationalism and much more. Cavell articulates a very particular and unorthodox interpretation of Wittgenstein, making use of his methodology, his examples and characterizations of ordinary, everyday problems by taking his 'philosophical intentions' to be essentially 'therapuetic' as opposed to 'constructive.' This is something Cavell has in common with both McDowell and Rorty though his hopes and desires for philosophy go beyond a simple critique of culture and beyond 'vocabulary changes' (Rorty) to include positive attempts to embody a philosophy that can live with the age old problems (of skepticism, the mind-body problem) that has plagued it for thousands of years. Though there are no end-all solutions to these problems, he believes, there is also no way to avoid grappling with them. The Claim of Reason is an attempt to embody and exemplify this belief by confronting traditional epistemology as well as the Wittgensteinian and Austinian methods of coming to terms with it. (Other reading sympathetic to this line of thought can be found in 'the new wittgenstein' eds. Alice Crary & Rupert Read)

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    1. Zizek, Slavoj
    2. Abelard, Pierre
    3. Adamson, Robert
    4. Adorno, Theodor W.
    5. Agrippa, Heinrich Cornelius
    6. Anselm Of Canterbury, St.
    7. Aquinas, St. Thomas
    8. Arendt, Hannah
    9. Aristotle
    10. Augustine Of Hippo, St.

    Philosophers

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