Popper, Karl

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach

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Good overview of 20th century philosophy of science
A Splendid intro to common-sense epistemology!
An Original, Creative Philosophy

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach
Karl R. Popper
Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics)
All Life is Problem Solving
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ASIN: 0198750242

Book Description

The essays in this volume represent an approach to human knowledge that has had a profound influence on many recent thinkers. Popper breaks with a traditional commonsense theory of knowledge that can be traced back to Aristotle. A realist and fallibilist, he argues closely and in simple language that scientific knowledge, once stated in human language, is no longer part of ourselves but a separate entity that grows through critical selection.

Customer Reviews:

Pretty good.......2006-04-17

Many reviewers have already put down a lot of information and advice on this book which I agree with and endorse. Karl Popper = brilliant philosopher of science, and his epistemology is pretty provocative. This book is about that epistemology.

I just wanted to point out, though, that Popper did not originate the idea of "Three Worlds" as most of the reviewers here seem to assert. He picked it up from Frege and ran with it. If you want the astounding arguments and proofs for the existence of said "Three Worlds," read "On Sense and Reference" and "Thought" by Frege--you can probably find both articles for free, online. If not, pick up virtually any anthology of analytic philosophy--they should be in there.

not good.......2003-07-01

This is a useless book, as I learnt after various re-readings of it and other philosohy of science books. The main points of the first chapter (on the problem of induction) have been long ago refuted by "the scourge of popperian deductivism", the great American philosopher Adolf Grünbaum. Popper's purported "solution" to the problem of induction is not taken seriously by professional philosophers (not to mention inductive logicians like Gaifman et. al.). The impression that one gets in the first (and last) reading of this chapter is the same as Schrödinger's, who said after reading Popper's Logik der Forschung (as reported by Feyeraband): "He says he does something about Hume's problem - but he doesn't, he just talks, and talks, and talks, and Hume's problem is still unsolved".

One of the notions which pervade the whole book, "verisimilitude", had been defined by Popper in a seemingly unobjectionable way in the 1960s, and verisimilitude was thought by Popperians (including Popper) to be an accessible and legitimate aim of science, given that truth was seen as an important but very elusive target. Popper even tells us here (chapter 8) that with his novel definition he has rehabilitated the notion of "verisimilitude" just as Tarski had rehabilitated the notion of truth. This turned out to be a vain hope. Popper's definition of verisimilitude was shown to be completely wrong - in that two FALSE theories could not be compared with respect to their verisimilitude in Popper's sense -, and moreover, since the 1970s all the work which has been done on this topic seems to support the conclusion that verisimilitude is neither a clear nor a useful a notion. Yet Popper had maintained that "we cannot do without this idea". The consequences of this failure for Popper's account of scientific knowledge, and for this book in particular, should therefore be evident for everyone. Moreover, the negative results concerning verisimilitude were discovered after the first edition of this book had been published. The make-shift amendments in the second edition are hardly enough to improve matters.

The conception of knowledge as a Darwinian process is a nice idea, but it is rather vague and also too emphatic and one sided: knowledge also has its "Lamarckian" aspects. The story about the amoeba and Einstein (Einstein is not ESSENTIALLY more intelligent than the ameba) is funny. The production of correct answers cannot, it seems, be reduced to the sheer overproduction of hypotheses and the elimination of incorrect ones. The process of HOW some hypotheses are designed from initial data is also important - a logic of discovery, that is. Popper is not interested in this, despite the title of his classic book on scientific method - the reason being...that any process of discovery is not DEDUCTIVELY VALID!

Another curious feature of the "objective knowledge" which Popper describes is that it resides in a platonic heaven of "statements in themselves": it is a knowledge "without a knowing subject" (sic), although, curiously enough, it is somehow dependent (if I understood this platonic myth correctly) on what we humans do.

The chapter on "The aim of Science" contains a point which was made by Popper in 1949. Newton's theory does not entail Kepler's third law nor Galileo's law of falling bodies: it is actually incompatible with them. The incompatibility with Galileo's law was perhaps more well known before Popper wrote this essay than the incompatibility with Kepler's law. But the lesson which Popper derives from this, namely, that inductivism is refuted, is certainly spurious.

The chapter on clouds (inderterministic systems) and clocks (deterministic systems) is suggestive in the poetic wording and the stories, but does not add much to the debate of determinism-indeterminism. Popper believes that all systems are clouds, although some more clocklike than others. Here is an argument: the determinist thesis implies that a deaf physicist would have been be able to write Mozart's compositions just by knowing Mozart's physical state at a certain time and predicting what he would write in the pentagram; but this is absurd. Therefore determinism is wrong.

The chapter on Evolution and the tree of knowledge is all wrong. Popper's views on the (un)scientific character of evolutionary theory were shown to be wrong by scientists and philosophers alike. This time, Popper says that the only thing Darwin did was to show that evolutionary explanations "can exist", that is, "are not logically impossible" (!), and that no Darwinist has ever provided evolutionary explanations of anything at all. Later Popper admitted that his views on Darwinism were sheer mistakes, but even so the later reformulations of his views were found to be also terribly misleading and confused. What is even more curious, Popper objects to the usual definition of fitness in terms of reproduction rates on the grounds that it does not take into account that such rates might be due not to fitness but to fecundity; but his amended statistical definition of comparative fitness (A is more fit than B if its survival rate is greater and its fecundity rate is less or equal) has all the vices of every attempt to DEFINE fitness in terms of survival rates: it renders evolutionary explanations circular (A survived because fit, and A is fit because it survived).

The "Logic" part of Popper's "A realist view of Logic, Physics and History" (ch. 8) is extremely odd. He defends classical logic on sheer PRAGMATIC grounds (its utility as a canon of critical procedure), but he does not answer the question of whether there is any CORRECT logic amongst the many logics, which is the WHOLE question of "realism" about logic.

The chapter on Tarski (ch.9) is also mainly incorrect. His discussion of the problem of truth bearers in note 1 is completely muddled and rash. For instance, he says that he employs "sentence" as a synonym of "interpreted sentence OR PROPOSITION" (!). The interpretation of Tarski's theory as a theory of correspondence with FACTS is entirely arbitrary. Tarski nowhere talks about facts, but Popper speaks EVERYWHERE about them, even of "supposed" facts, of "real" facts, of "the world of facts" and what not. He also says that "Tarski's theory" allows us to define REALITY as "that with which true sentences correspond". Reality would in turn be "the set of real facts". It is needless to say that these grotesque fancies are not to be found nor suggested in Tarski's careful and precise work on truth.

There is almost nothing to be learnt from this book, and much to become confused about.

Good overview of 20th century philosophy of science.......2002-12-08

In a recent article on the relation between natural philosophy and quantum chromodynamics (the physical theory of the strong nuclear interaction), Frank Wilcek, a well-recognized researcher in elementary particle physics, included the following entertaining passage:

A man walks into a bar, takes a seat on the next-to-last stool, and spends the evening chatting up the empty stool next to him, being charming and flirtatious, as if there were a beautiful women in that empty seat. The next night, same story. And the next night, same story again. Finally the bartender can't take it any more. She asks, "Why do you keep talking to that empty stool as if there were a beautiful woman in it?".

The man answers, "I am a philosopher. Hume taught us that it's logically possible that a beautiful woman will suddenly materialize on that stool, and no one has ever refuted him. If one does appear, then obviously I'll seem very clever indeed, and I'll have the inside track with her."

"That's ridiculous", says the bartender, who happens to be a physicist. "Plenty of very attractive women come to this bar all the time. You're reasonably presentable, and extremely articulate; if you applied your charm on one of them, you might succeed".

"I thought about trying that," he replies, "but I couldn't prove it would work."

I included this passage in this review not to ridicule the work of David Hume but to emphasize that his philosophy of science is in no way troubling. The author of this book though spent most of his professional life attempting to refute the views of Hume and then justify the practice of science "objectively". In the first few paragraphs of this book, the author sounds bitter about the lack of recognition for his work on "the problem of induction", which he felt Hume had shown to have devastating consequences on the "truth" of science. The search for an objective, rational "foundation" of science has occupied the time of this author and many others, who hold to the idea that scientific knowledge needs such a foundation and the Humean challenge must be answered. To those readers who agree with the author in this regard, this book would be of interest. To those who do not, this book could possibly be read as an exercise in mental gymnastics. There are some places in the book where issues are raised that are important in fields such as artificial intelligence, but as a whole the book is typical of 20th century philosophy of science: it holds as axiomatic that scientific knowledge needs an underlying foundation.

Since I personally do not believe the David Hume has to be answered at all, a review of the author's arguments against Hume would be misplaced. Having read Hume's works in detail, and having walked away from them puzzled as to why they are considered so "formidable" or "devastating", my interest in this book was purely subjective: that of gaining insight as to why many philosophers of science are so deeply troubled by Hume's philosophy and other science skeptics. Finishing the book still left my questions unanswered in this regard, and judging by a perusal of the literature on the philosophy of science, Humean skepticism is still considered the "thing to answer". Scientific truth is still held in doubt to a large degree, and debates on it in the social and political realm usually take place in the context of religion or why creationism should be taught in the public schools.

But science needs no foundation. The game of philosophy should now be what consequences science has for philosophy. What theories of truth, of ethics, of knowledge, are possible for philosophy because of science? If this book were rewritten to reflect this attitude, its content would be very different, possibly more elaborate in its views. The avenues that science opens up in ethics, epistemology, and ontology are rich in information theory, mathematics, logic, and many other areas. Scientific and technological advances are exploding at an unprecedented rate, and no Humean challenge or backlash can stop it.....thankfully.

A Splendid intro to common-sense epistemology!.......2002-11-21

To those who've not read Popper before, I highly reccomend that you statrt now- and with this book. To those who have experienced these pages first-hand, you understand why Popper and the theories herein are so important.

As short-windedly as possible, I'd like to say how I came to read him. I had forayed into philosophy through Ayn Rand who managed to convince me- as she does so many readerss- that philosophy is a chasm between soft relativism and hard objectivism. Either one believes in absolute truth and reasons 100% ability to grasp it, she wrote, or that truth is a chimera and as such, reality is mutable. I believed her. Later though, I grew restless. Truth is out there, I supposed, but how can we guarantee that our beliefs are and will always be correct? Grudgingly, I read Popper and it all made sense.

Most are familiar with Poppers theories on demarcation and epistemology but this book goes into great detail on both in clear, enjoyable language. Truth, Popper tells us, is absolute. It is certainty that creates the dilemma. Since experience has shown us that objective reality exists, science works but does not take us the full way. Theories are superceded and what once seemed true may not tomorrow. So the ultimmate test of a theory should not be whether it can be VERIFIED- if we look for supporting evidence of a pretty good yet minorly false theory, we'll probably find it- but whehter the theory can be FALSIFIED- if we look for evidence against a pretty good yet minorly false theory, it's easier, quicker and beter to find IT. What does this mean? Reality exists, otherwise why do science- it's just our CERTAINTY of any belief that will prove elusive. This book, in its small yet powerful essays, explains, examines and defends this theory of an evolutionary approach to knowledge (i.e., science.) Popper is not Foucoult; his intention is not to destroy science but to enhance it.

If you're like me, in awe of Popper's theories, perplexed as to why more people aren't and would like to read others who give similar views, one can do no better than C.S. Pierce and John Dewey. Especially Dewey's "Quest for Certainty" which underlines the experimental process of knowledge and breaks down the false dualism of knowledge and action. Also, Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn (don't believe what Kuhn's critics, even Popper himself, says about him) have similar approaches. for a contemporaary Popperian style, read Susan Haack's "Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate." Not to dissuade you from reading this first as this is the starting points, the other books are enhancements. Fall in love with science!

An Original, Creative Philosophy.......2001-12-29

When an undergraduate in college, I was mainly exposed to so called "Continental" philosophy which seems to have a tendency, to say the least, toward bosh, and to analytic philosophy which seems to have a tendency, to say the least, toward triviality, plus, since it was a Catholic college, selections from Plato, Aristotle, and medieval metaphysicians.
I could not really acclimate myself with these doctrines. It is in a sense unfortunate that I found an alternative outside my formal schooling. With Popper I found someone who is readable--I think that any intelligent general reader can understand him--original, and with an outlook congruent with natural science.
He is known for his ideas on scientific method--that science does not really "prove" theories, but creates conjectures which have rich empirical content and withstand falsification. With ideas like this, decades ago, he attacked doctrines like Marxism, and psycho-analysis. Demolishing the claims of these doctrines may seem to be no big deal today, but decades ago they were major tools of our intellecutal elites.
This book covers old ground such as his views on science but also, it seems to me, breaks new ground. A new contribution is his theory of the Three Worlds, which I think is fruitful. He also deals with the question of free will, which I sense is the weakest part of his book.
Popper distinguishes three realms or 'worlds.' World1 is the world of physical objects; World2 is the world of our subjective beliefs, thoughts, feelings; World3 is what he calls an objective world of knowledge, the objective contents of thought--the knowledge contained in books, musuems, libraries, etc.
Popper holds that most philosophers considered the object of epistemology--the theory of knowledge--to be World2. Popper argues that this is misguided. He thinks it is, to use his words, "irrelevant." The proper object for epistemology is World3. We should concern ourselves not with justifying our subjective beliefs but with objective theories--their contents, the arguments supporting them, etc.
A theory of knowledge based on World3 has some interesting ramifications. It is immune from modern relativistic attacks (this is my personal view). World2 epistemology has premises, both implicit and explicit, that make it vulnerable to relativistic attacks. World3 epistemology, instead, proceeds with the GROWTH of knowledge. Another interesting feature of World3 is that, even though it is man-made, it is autonomous. If humanity were to disappear, World3 will still be "outthere". World3 is created by individuals with certain goals, but the contents of World3 seem to have a life of its own(and this is very metaphorical). It can be used by others in different ways, it leads to new problems and solutions not considered before, etc.
Popper also deals with the problem of understanding in the humanities. There are some who hold that there is a difference between understanding in the natural sciences and understanding in the human sciences--that in fields like history, psychology, sociology, one has to understand by a method which seems to me to be something like a mystical intuitive grasp of the thoughts of another. Popper thinks that this is old hat. The method to, say, reconstruct a damaged ancient text is fundamentally no different from understanding regularities in nature.
Popper died not too long before the advent of the world wide web. It seems to me that Popper's ideas on the three worlds are very applicable to the world wide web. The World Wide Web would fall under the category of World3. It has an ever expanding content of knowledge, of conjectures, of arguments and discussion. Being a part of World3, it is human made, but the world wide web has a certain autonomy. A road built on the web by one person for one thing can be used in different ways by different people.

The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge Classics)

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Philosophy of History: Prove untruth, not truth
Portrait of the Philosopher-King as an Artist
Read the free excerpt - pg 7 Plato vs Pericles
A DIFFERENT VIEW OF PLATO
Refuting Plato

The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge Classics)
Karl R. Popper
Manufacturer: Routledge
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)
Popper Selections
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach

ASIN: 0415278422

Customer Reviews:

Philosophy of History: Prove untruth, not truth.......2007-05-04

To Popper, science is a process of "conjectures and refutations"-- advancing bold conjectures about the state of the world and then trying to refute them. "Even in the study of history, objectivity should be sought in the institutions and traditions of a discipline. It is only through the give and take of open criticism and the ongoing interplay of many different kinds of biases that anything approaching objectivity will emerge." Thus, "truth" is seen as a hypothesis--you can't prove truth, you can only prove untruth. This is because one cannot know everything, therefore, nothing can be proved to be true.
Open societies, in Popper's definition, with their ideals of freedom and reason, of men who may create their own future, are opposed to the regimes of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Hegel and Marx are the main focus of the book. Aristotle built his theory on Plato; Hegel on Aristotle; Marx on Hegel. Popper is concerned with their philosophies of history. A philosophy of history is an attempt to interpret systematically the historical process by a principle that unifies the results of research and points to an "ultimate meaning" behind the process. It involves systematic reflection on scientifically derived data about the past. All the parts are unified to form a whole with "ultimate meaning."
It was thus not Marx's historicist method which led him to success, but instead the "methods of institutional analysis." In many democratic, capitalist countries production has been so great that the workers have a higher standard of living than Marx ever envisaged. He also had an unrealistic view of human nature--that because man is born good, changing his environment will bring happiness. But this view ignores the universality of human imperfection, and the sacredness of personality that is lost in the communist state.

Yet, Popper claims that Marx has done Christianity a great service by pointing out the humanitarian demands of Christ. Popper made many generalizations about Christianity without describing the basic tenets that have made Christianity "the strongest opponent of Communism." Popper does not view Christianity as being a "substitute from dreams and wish--fulfillment; it should resemble neither the holding of a ticket in a lottery, nor the holding of a policy in an insurance company." Popper opposes a "leap in the dark" of faith, whether by Marxists probing the beginning of evolution, or by those experiencing a personal relationship with God. Faith is necessary, but it is to be based on a rational understanding of the difference between belief and fact, and the appropriate place for both.

Portrait of the Philosopher-King as an Artist.......2006-08-22

When confronted with the rise of totalitarianism and the destruction of all that he held dear, Poper felt a single, overwhelming urge: to return to the Greeks, to the dawn of our civilization, so as to understand the root of the evil and to offer a practical way out of bestiality. His search was motivated by the insight that "this civilization has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth--the transition from the tribal or 'closed society', with its submission to magical forces, to the 'open society', which sets free the critical powers of man."

Heraclitus set the stage with his claim that "the cosmos, at best, is like a rubbish heap scattered at random." If "everything is in flux" and "you cannot step twice into the same river", then at least we can try to discover the historical or evolutionary laws which will enable us to prophesy the destiny of man.

Plato's claim to greatness is to have discovered such a law: that "all social change is corruption or decay or degeneration," and that the only way to break this cycle of decay is to arrest development and return to the Golden Age, where no change occurs. His belief in perfect and unchanging things, the Platonic Ideas from which all things originate, finds its expression in all fields of inquiry: be it social justice, nature and convention, wisdom and truth, or goodness and beauty.

Behind these lofty ideals, Popper uncovers a discomforting truth: Plato envisioned the ideal Greek polity as a totalitarian nightmare, where the 'race of the guardians' had to be kept pure from any miscegenation and where the role of the rulers was to breed the human cattle according to some esoteric formula (the 'Platonic Number', a number determining the True Period of the human race). Along his apology of Sparta came his endorsement of infanticide and his recommendation that children of both sexes be "brought within the sight of actual war and made to taste blood."

Popper demonstrates that these crazy ideas were not the vague mumblings of an otherwise sound philosopher: they were central tenets in Plato's philosophy, a system which has been characterized by another author as "the most savage and most profound attack upon liberal ideas which history can show."

Popper connects this extreme radicalism of the Platonic approach with its aestheticism, i.e. with "the desire to build a world which is not only a little better and more rational than ours, but which is free from all its ugliness." Plato, the Philosopher-King, can be best characterized as an artist: a man attracted to a world of pure beauty, a craftsman who tries to visualize an ideal model of his work and to copy it faithfully, and for whom "the part has to be executed for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part." His desire to "start from a clean canvas" or his claim to prefer "the original to the copy" find disturbing echoes in contemporary political debates. Contrary to Plato's belief, however, the canvas can never be made clean, and the copy often improves upon the original.

Let's give Popper the last word: "But there I must protest. I do not believe that human lives may be made the means for satisfying an artist's desire for self-expression. We must demand, rather, that every man should be given, if he wishes, the right to model his life himself, as far as this does not interfere too much with others. Much as I sympathize with the aesthetic impulse, I suggest that the artist might seek expression in another material."

Read the free excerpt - pg 7 Plato vs Pericles.......2006-03-10

Click on the book and keep clicking to page 7 - two quotes from Plato vs Pericles, which could have been written yesterday.
I may be moving and I'm busy, so no I have not read the book, but every now and then I reread that page 7 - how INSPIRING !

A DIFFERENT VIEW OF PLATO.......2005-10-30

I wish Popper were still alive because there are so FEW philosophers who can write so clearly.

Volume 1 of the Open Society is a critique of historicism and an analysis of how Plato's later thought supports totalitarianism, not democracy.

Popper presents a convincing argument about the danger of deifying philosophers of the past. He shows how some of the ideas of Plato are imbedded in our culture in ways that do not always support an Open Society, by which he means not only democracy but a society that is OPEN to learning from its mistakes and adapting to change.

If you are interested in political philosophy or the interaction of philosopy and society, this book is worth your time.

Refuting Plato.......2005-10-06

Popper wrote this book for me and for people like me, i.e. for people who stand in awe of Plato simply because he is Plato.

I read Plato's Republic in 1985 or thereabouts. I had learned of the allegory of the cave in class and wanted to know more. Also, in one M*A*S*H episode, the Republic was among the books Frank Burns was burning, so of course I had to read it. I did, and apart from Book One's denunciation of the maxim "Might Makes Right", I felt uneasy about the rest of the work. At the time, I felt that there must have been something wrong with me, that I wasn't reading it right, that after all having stood the test of time for over two thousand years Plato simply couldn't be wrong. If only I had known of Popper in 1985!

Popper is in many ways pointing out the obvious: that Emperor Plato is wearing no clothes. His Republic is nothing more than a totalitarian state and his value system represses the individual in favour of the State.

Popper begins by describing what he calls "Historicism" or the belief that history develops according to laws from which the future could be predicted, with Heraclitus being the first "historicist". Popper then continues with an overview Plato's thought, especially his Theory of Forms and his brilliant sociological insights. He then exposes over three chapters Plato's political programme to bring about a perfect City-State, and here is where Popper points out the obvious: Plato's Republic is a totalitarian state that controls every facet of the lives of all its citizens and represses any every invidual path to happiness.

In the last chapter, Popper sketches out how an Open Society would work and gives the example of Athens just before Plato. Unlike others who have savaged Plato (e.g. Ayn Rand) Popper doesn't lay out a master plan to replace Plato's. He doesn't believe in utopias, Platonic or otherwise. Popper believes in what he calls "Piecemeal Social Engineering" i.e. fixing problems as they come up, or improving institutions when the opportunity arises.

This is Popper's Open Society. One where we accept that things are as they are, that they can be improved, that individuals are the only judges of their own happiness and that they should have complete freedom to pursue it as they see fit, insofar as they don't harm others too much. His test for an Open Society is very simple: a society is open if its government can change without bloodshed.

In 1948, Scott Buchanan wrote, in the introduction to Penguin's Portable Plato, that "the reading of Plato's dialogues by a large number of people could make the difference between a century of folly and a century of wisdom for the world". Perhaps, but only if the reader approches Plato without awe and with a critical mind. As did Popper.

Vincent Poirier, Tokyo

Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers

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MORAL RULE: Thou shall not threaten visiting lecturers with fireplace pokers
Decent biographical coverage but very inadequete handling of the underlying philosophy
A book of personalities
For real!
A Balanced account of a very interesting event

Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers
David Edmonds , and John Eidinow
Manufacturer: Harper Perennial
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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On Certainty

ASIN: 0060936649
Release Date: 2002-09-17

Book Description

On October 25, 1946, in a crowded room in Cambridge, England, the great twentieth-century philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper came face to face for the first and only time. The meeting -- which lasted ten minutes -- did not go well. Their loud and aggressive confrontation became the stuff of instant legend, but precisely what happened during that brief confrontation remained for decades the subject of intense disagreement.

An engaging mix of philosophy, history, biography, and literary detection, Wittgenstein's Poker explores, through the Popper/Wittgenstein confrontation, the history of philosophy in the twentieth century. It evokes the tumult of fin-de-siécle Vienna, Wittgentein's and Popper's birthplace; the tragedy of the Nazi takeover of Austria; and postwar Cambridge University, with its eccentric set of philosophy dons, including Bertrand Russell. At the center of the story stand the two giants of philosophy themselves -- proud, irascible, larger than life -- and spoiling for a fight.

Customer Reviews:

MORAL RULE: Thou shall not threaten visiting lecturers with fireplace pokers.......2007-05-20

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"Take a dispute fundamental to philosophy, for whose future both [exceptional] men felt personal responsibility; take the cultural, social, and political differences between [these two men]; take the obsession of one with the other, who is in turn totally self-absorbed; take their no-holds-barred style of communication; take their complex relationship with their father figure, Russell--throw all these into the caldron that was H3 and a major explosion seems to have been inevitable. The poker becomes only a fuse."

The above is found near the end of this fascinating book authored by award-winning BBC journalists David Edmonds and John Eidinow. This book has been published in over a dozen languages.

This book hinges on one small ambiguous bite-sized brouhaha that occurred in October 1946 in room H3 located in King's College (a part of Cambridge University in England). Two prominent names of 20TH century philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 to 1951) and Karl Popper (1902 to 1994) debated one another for the first and only time. (The debate was mediated by yet another prominent name in philosophy, Bertrand Russell {1872 to 1970}.) Their encounter lasted only ten minutes and, as you can surmise from the above quotation, did not go so well. Almost immediately, rumors began to spread globally and one version of the story suggested that these two had come to blows, armed with red-hot fireplace pokers.

Be aware that this is not a philosophy book even though it does contain some philosophy. The poker incident is used as a starting point or "springboard" for investigating all of the important historical events particularly in Vienna and Cambridge that shaped this incident. In other words, this story is presented in a very roundabout way, circling back to the poker incident while examining all that needs to be taken into account in fully understanding what transpired. (Some readers may not like this roundabout approach.)

As well, there is good and significant biographical detail given of Wittgenstein and Popper. One chapter is devoted to discussing Russell, "the third man" in this story.

This is a well-written book that's engaging and accessible with some humorous spots---a delight to read even if you're a non-philosopher. I found that I learned a lot, painlessly, without even noticing.

This is a surprisingly well-researched book. Information was gathered not just from books but from interviews & correspondence including eyewitnesses and those who knew one or both of these two philosophers. These people "gave their time to search their memories, offer their recollections and furnish us [the authors] with background information" and "invaluable help."

Finally, there are more than twenty illustrations in the middle of this book in the form of black and white photographs or "plates." I found that these enhanced the book's readability and enjoyment.

In conclusion, the authors of this book "make the meeting of Popper and Wittgenstein seem as fateful as that between the iceberg and the Titanic." An interesting and enjoyable read!!

(first published 2001; 23 chapters; main narrative 295 pages; Appendices: (1) chronology (of the lives of Wittgenstein and Popper) (2) "Times" literary supplement letters (where several witnesses address the poker incident); acknowledgments; sources; index)

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Decent biographical coverage but very inadequete handling of the underlying philosophy.......2007-01-04

Nearly no insight into the actual philosophical differences that the two protagonists had. Tries to be biographical and the authors try to make feeble attempts at trying to convince that all they had were historical differences. Shows clearly that the writers are journalists and their hold over the philosophical underpinnings is negligible. A waste of time if you are looking for philosophical insights. If you are looking for a semi-biographical account of the lives of these two great philosophers, there are other books out there which serve the purpose better. In the end, it is an attempt to sensationalize what in my opinion was a minor event and comes across as quite contrived.

A book of personalities.......2006-12-04

A student of philosophy will find this book interesting for its descriptions of prominent personalities (including Russell), but this book does not contain any particularly profound discussions of philosophy. The ideas of both Wittgenstein and Popper are given a shallow explanations; in addition the basic ideas of some other philosophical schools that came and went are discussed. However, the lives of these men are interesting, and the the author's commentary on the historical importance of the ideas of these men is also interesting. In addition this book gives Wittgenstein fans some helpful information on the evolution of Wittgenstein's ideas that may not be apparent from the paucity of documents that comprise Wittgenstein's writings.

For real!.......2006-08-25

I can't think of a better technique to "smarty-pants" your way through a game of Texas Hold 'Em than what's outlined here. Let's just hope the rumors that Edmonds and Eidinow are finishing up their draft of "Spinoza's Three Card Monte" aren't simply the liquor talking.

A Balanced account of a very interesting event.......2006-07-26

It is the story of an infamous confrontation in 1946 between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. Clearly this is not the sort of book you are likely to pick up unless you are interested in the history of modern philosophy. The book attracted my eye because I had recently read Popper's autobiography, The Unended Quest.

As a fan of Popper, I might be inclined to share his view that Wittgenstein was one of the enemies of philosophy. However, this is a very balanced account of how these two Vienese natives came to have such opposing views. Basically, Popper argued that not only were philosophical problems still important, but that they were what made it worth doing. In contrast, as one of the giants of linguistic analysis, Wittgenstein argued that there were no valid philosophical problems, only puzzles of lanquage.

Many non-professional phiosophers would share Popper's opinion that this is exactly were philosophy went astray and became non-relevent to the real world.

Even if you know nothing about philosophy this is a highly readable account of an unusual event and an excellent introduction to how both made important contributions to modern thought.

The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics)

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A philosphical classic
Tritium.
Very interesting
Popper's magnum opus
A philosopher's view of science

The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics)
Karl Popper
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Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)
The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge Classics)
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach
Against Method

ASIN: 0415278449

Book Description

When first published in 1959, this book revolutionized contemporary thinking about science and knowledge. It remains the one of the most widely read books about science to come out of the twentieth century.

Customer Reviews:

A philosphical classic.......2007-06-18

Not exactly light reading, but a great reference work, and a clear expostion of Popper's Falsificationism. This methodology is widely regarded as the leading tool for demarcating between science and non-science or pseudo-science.

Tritium........2007-05-07

"what do you do with your time once the truth is already known?". Taken from Mr. Tritium's review. WHAT????????????????????????????????????????
If you are aware of the truth, then please let the rest of humanity in on the secret my friend! LOL. This is obviously somebody with a defeatist attitude toward science. The Truth with a capital T? hmmmm. Who NOW acknowledges Marxism,or Freudianism as science? Marxism was first and foremost an ECONOMIC THEORY. Economics has progressed, but I would think most scientist would agree it's not truely a science in the same category of the hard sciences. Freudianism can't be falsified because it involves the introspections of the subjective person. Hence it's not worth pursueing and has been replaced with neuroscience and cognitive science. That's when Popper comes in with falsifiability. Has not phlogiston, lumniferous ether, immutability in species and teleology been falsified? Yes they have. One could go on and on about falsified theories. That is surely progress. When has science proposed that it's theories are known with utter certainty? It has always been provisional and contingent. What the hell would be the sense in engaging in science if you "discover" or forumulate a hypothesis for investigation but then say, "Oh wait, the truth is known." Post Modernism started long before Popper. Post Modernism can be traced to Neitzsche and William James as well among earilier philosophers. The one thing I can never understand about people who critisize science is that they ASSUME scientist claim they know the Truth regarding everything. Known as scientism in theological and philosophical circles. I think I smell a christian apologist wolf in sheep's clothing here. The book still stands as being quite valid along with it's ideas.

Very interesting.......2006-12-24

I have to ask myself, "What is the basis for my scientific knowledge?" On a daily basis, as I am a chemist. I have often been struck by arguments for "induction" as lacking credibility, because how can one argue of probabilities with an unknown sample size? Popper argues that a proposing scientific hypothesis is an inductive act, but it is a creative act not a logical one, but that scientific knowledge is dedective.

I agree with him. The nature of science is such that one must put for statements about how the world works and test them. A scientist should always try to find a way of proving himself or herself wrong. If the predictions of the test are shown to be false, then the hypothesis must be false. That is the basis of scientific knowledge. The rest, the best theories we have are just "working models" and we can never justify why they work. They're simply our best working models now.

I don't find Popper's argument disheartening. Popper points out that we don't have to justify our search for explanations of the world, because they may do us benefit (if we happened to live in a world with stable physical laws, for instance).

I think many scientists would fundamentally agree that the laws of nature can never really be proven. They can't, but they speak volumes about what is relevant to us as a species (which is why Popper's argument that "induction" is creative is so interesting). All Popper asks of a scientific hypothesis is that it can, in principle, be demonstrated false by experience.

This is by far one of the most interesting and (I feel) important books I've ever read.

Popper's magnum opus.......2006-11-23

The Logic of Scientific Discovery is in my view Karl Popper's finest work. When I studied science I was amazed at the insight Popper had into the scientific method of inquiry, and I admired his refusal to accept intellectual garbage.

While Popper has come under strong attack from both scientists and philosophers for several shortcomings in his work, in my view Popper has framed one of the most important studies of scientific knowledge and how it is gained, and the difference between science and non-science.

I agree with Popper's argument that the key feature of scientific theories is that they are 'falsifiable.' By this Popper simply meant that a scientific theory, even if beautiful, can be shown wrong by empirical observation. While this account is no doubt oversimplified and leaves out the key social and historical dimensions to science (which thinkers such as Kuhn addressed later on), this principle remains central to science; as Feynman said, 'If it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong.' The fallibility of science in Popper's view was the key to its strength, in contrast to pseudo-sciences such as Marxism and Freudian psychology, which while containing elements of truth, set themselves up as infallible truths and glossed over things which contradicted the belief system.

Popper also wrote many other philosophical works, including an important study of the difference between democratic political societies and ones ruled by totalitarian ideaology. However, he rightly deserves fame as one of the most important 20th century philosophers of science.

A philosopher's view of science.......2006-09-22

In this book Popper presents two contradictory theses: (a) science can be based on deductive logic only, and there is no need for induction; (b) science cannot have a logical basis.

Because deduction yields sure knowledge if it is based on sure knowledge and induction always produces only hypothetical knowledge, as Bertrand Russell clearly stated, Popper begins by trying to show that the use of deduction instead of induction can provide a solid logical basis for science. He talks about replacing "inductivism" by "deductivism." In reality, he explains the use of deduction in the testing of a theory: consequences are deduced from the theory and are compared with known facts, which is something known by many. Induction, on the other hand, is used in creating hypotheses in both experimental and theoretical investigations and is again used in generalizing the results of tests (a) to all other possible tests in experimental investigation, and (b) also to some phenomena that cannot be used to test the theory created using the hypothesis, or hypotheses, that are produced inductively. When Popper claims that inductivism can be replaced by deductivism, he is unaware of the fact that induction is used at the beginning of both experimental and theoretical investigations to create hypotheses and again at the end of the investigation to generalize the test results.

But in the rest of the book, Popper concentrates on the generalization of test results, which is done through induction and is what he overlooked to begin with, as explained above. Consequently, Popper proves rightly that scientific knowledge cannot be produced using deductive logic, which is the opposite of what he tried to prove earlier.

The truth is that new knowledge is not a product of logic but is learned from the world about singular phenomena and is generalized through induction. Induction does not yield logically sure knowledge, but evolution created the human brain/mind so that it knows that it has to trust induction. Thus, everyone avoids hitting his or her head against hard objects by learning from past experience through induction. Someone who does not trust such inductive knowledge is punished severely. Similarly, when a scientist or an engineer does not use an accepted theory anywhere in his or her work, he or she is likely to be punished by failure and its consequences of many kinds.

Popper's views should serve to waken up those who seek the comfort of producing all knowledge through deduction only, but in fact, they shed doubt mostly on theories, because a theory is not deduced from anywhere, unlike empirical knowledge is, about some singular phenomena. A theory is constructed and tested by using induction or deduction, as necessary, at various stages of the total process on the basis of empirical knowledge. Popper's views are those of a philosopher who is not familiar with the mission and methods of science and thinks that science is about discovering something that can be called the absolute truth. Read also my evaluation of Kuhn's views.

Another erroneous idea of Popper is that theories can be falsified but cannot be verified. It is true that if a new theory is falsified by a few or even a single test, there is usually no more wish to keep testing it. But when an accepted theory is falsified by one phenomenon, it is not discarded as invalid. Its use continues where it gives good results. It is also true that a theory cannot be verified in an absolute sense, but this is true also about empirical knowledge. The generality of any knowledge is a consequence of induction which is forced upon the mind by the results of evolution, as mentioned. The verification of a theory, or any knowledge, means that it can be used where it gives useful results. Unfortunately, the impossibility of the logical or experimental validation of knowledge in a general way is seen as a weakness of only theories by those who ignore what a theory is and how it is constructed, tested, and used.

Conjeturas Y Refutaciones/ Conjectures and Refutations: El Desarrollo Del Conocimiento Cientifico/ the Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Paidos Basica / Basic Paidos)

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Conjeturas Y Refutaciones/ Conjectures and Refutations: El Desarrollo Del Conocimiento Cientifico/ the Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Paidos Basica / Basic Paidos)
Karl Raimund Popper
Manufacturer: Ediciones Paidos Iberica
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Fun read, but there are many better.
A Taste of Popper

All Life is Problem Solving
Karl Popper
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The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics)
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ASIN: 0415249929

Book Description

All Life is Problem Solving is a stimulating and provocative selection of Popper's writings on some of the main preoccupations during the last twenty-five years of his life. The collection illuminates Popper's process of working out key formulations in his theory of science, and indicates his view of the state of the world at the end of the Cold War and after the collapse of communism.

Customer Reviews:

Fun read, but there are many better........2003-03-20

I am a long-time Karl Popper fan. I've read all but, I believe, 4 books of his. To my knowledge, this is his shortest at 161 pages - all consisting of essays. This is also the book of his that is the least original. If you're a long-time fan, you've read these ideas before. If you are a newcomer, there are better books to start with.

For all that, the first essay, "The Logic and Evolution of Scientific Theory" is the best short summary of Popper's views on science that I've read. The second essay is also a good summary of Popper's theories of body/mind interactionism, an odd position for a modern theoriest to hold.

The second half, although quite unoriginal (I've started to realize that Popper's views on freedom, democracy, open society, etc. were better expressed by James Madison)is still quite interesting. Also, this book, I'm quite sure for the first time, gives us Popper's views towards international policy. 'Waging Wars for Peace', an excerpt from a radio interview, is pretty timely in 2003 and reminds us that there can be no thing as an absolute pacifist. Not destroying someone certain to kill only postpones. The title essay, at 6 pages, is another timely celebration of technology; timely because many on the right and left (for different reasons about different techonologies) are preaching against technologies while failing to see the many good sides.

All in all, a quick and fairly worthwhile read. The experienced reader of Popper, again, will find nothing new here. [...]

A Taste of Popper.......2003-02-18

This book is a collection of 15 lectures/speeches/interviews that Popper gave at various points throughout his career (earliest 1958, latest 1994). They are organized into two sections (1) those related to natural science and (2) those related to history and politics. The first section relates to theory of science and knowledge in an evolutionary context with the process of problem solving at the core. In the second section Popper addresses problem solving more generally ("all life is problem solving") and shares his thoughts on subjects such as war, peace, communism, and interpretation of history.

This book has the weaknesses and strengths that you would expect from a work not originally intended to be published in written form. The benefits are that the chapters are fairly brief and easy to read. Also, Popper's style is nearly anti-academic as he tries almost too hard to simplify the material in order to make it understandable to all. The primary drawbacks are that the book can't be well organized and there are significant repetition and overlap in ideas. Additionally, the book doesn't provide the level of detail that one normally expects in a book by a major thinker.

This is the first book of Popper's that I've read. I became interested in his work by being briefly introduced to some of his thinking from other authors. This book did not provide enough detail to satisfy my interest in Popper, but it served to confirm to me that he is a first rate thinker and that his other works should be near the top of my reading list. I especially enjoyed the surprise of reading Popper's thoughts on Saddam Hussein and the threat of nuclear weapons - highly relevant to our situation today (early 2003). There is no doubt where Popper would stand on the current debate about Iraq.

So this is a good book to get a taste of Popper or maybe for a quick review of some of his thinking if you are already familiar with him. However, this isn't the best book for studying Popper's ideas in detail.

Philosophy and the Real World: An Introduction to Karl Popper
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Magisterial introduction.

unended tribute.

Philosophy and the Real World: An Introduction to Karl Popper
Bryan Magee
Manufacturer: Open Court Publishing Company
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ASIN: 0875484360

Customer Reviews:

Magisterial introduction........2002-11-23

Bryan Magee summarizes in this small book superbly the work of Karl Popper: the elimination of the induction problem, the falsification criterion as a demarcation between science and non-science, the characterization of marxism as well as the Enlightment (the perfectibility of man) as historicisms, the responsibility of the individual.
The best possible introduction to the work of one of the most important philosophers of all times.

unended tribute........2000-03-28

Karl Popper was the celebrated author of a good number of philosophy of science books. Reading this book by B Magee on Pooper one can follow very complex and far reching concepts of the man with ease. The clearity in which Mr Magee explores the key ideas on history, science and methapisics of him decerves praise. The books could have been a tiresome account of Popper theories and abstract conceps but insted is an engaging narrative of ideas and their crucial inportance in the history of scientific discovery and the relation to history it self. Karl Pooper decerves to be read more and Brian Magee has given us to oportunity to know why. Magee knew Popper well (Confessions of a philosopher), and not only he loved him, but respect him most for his thoughts and inteligence. After reading this introduction of Popper ideas one can not help doing the same for both of them.

Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)

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Conjectures and Refutations
How do we know what we know? We don't, we only guess...
Conjectures and Refutations
an enjoyable book
Hypothesis-Attempt to Falsify- Conclude-Repeat!

Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)
Karl R. Popper
Manufacturer: Routledge
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The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics)
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach
The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge Classics)
The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge Classics)

ASIN: 0415285941

Book Description

This classic remains one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history.

Customer Reviews:

Conjectures and Refutations.......2007-05-15

This is Popper at his mature full authoritive best. This work connects his early classic on Open Society with the works of contemporary philosiphers as well as with the Greeks. Popper makes the connection with modern science and it's foundations from the ancients. Anyone how has failed to avail themselves of Poppers insights into knowing and learning is the poorer for it.

How do we know what we know? We don't, we only guess..........2005-09-23

We guess. We make up a story that explains the phenomena we observe. Why is there night and day? Because the sun rises from the east and sets itself down in the west. Aha! Let's check that. Let's go east. After a while we realize that we're living on a sphere and so we know our story is wrong. The sun does not rise up and set. So what does it do? We're on a ball and the sun is above and it moves around us! Great! Problem solved. But wait! Let's check that. The stars also move. Let's plot their course, and then... and so on and so forth.

For Popper, this is how we've built up our picture of the world. We make bold conjectures to explain what we see see and then we check, or rather we establish a failure test. If the test is true, then our guess is false. But if we only test to see if a guess is false, rather than to try and prove that it's true, then how do we know our guess is true? Popper answers that we do not and cannot ever know that. Knowledge lies beyond our grasp, we can only seek knowledge without ever hoping to attain it.

This is the central theme of Conjectures and Refutations, which itself is a comprehensive overview of Popper's epistemological thought. The book is divided in two parts titled, you guessed it, I-Conjectures and II-Refutations.

Part I, Conjectures, comprises the first ten chapters. Popper begins with an overview of his thesis, then explores the nature of the problems that face people who think about the world and who act in it (chapter 2), he presents three other views of what we mean by knowledge (ch. 3), he describes tradition and the history of thought (chapters 4 to 6) and then turns to a critique of Kant, and of the effect that Newton's astonishingly successful theory of gravity, unrefuted for over 200 years, had on the development of western science (chapter 7). Popper then closes part I with discussions on what the difference is between science and metaphysics, on why mathematics works so well in describing the world, and finally on the nature of scientific knowledge, i.e. what do we mean by "knowledge".

In part II, Refutations, Popper does not present anything, he destroys existing theories which he feels are wrong. He returns to metaphysics and because it deals in existential statements that are irrefutable (e.g. you can't prove the Devil's existence or non-existence) he seeks to separate its pursuits from that of science. Science deals only in refutable statements.

Then Popper attacks other theories and problems. He gives a succinct summary of his attack on historicism, his name for the belief that History follows laws (e.g. Marxism) and that historians should be able to predict the future course of mankind.

In short, Conjectures and Refutations is a complete introduction to Popper's thinking. It sketches out all his thoughts on the social sciences and describes in fair detail his thinking on the development of science. He ends on a positive note. It may seem depressing that we can never obtain true knowledge, but we can certainly find sufficiently rich rewards in the pursuit of it.

Conjectures and Refutations.......2005-01-10

This book is divided into two sections - "Conjectures" and "Refutations". Roughly, or not so roughly, these titles refer to the basic aim of the essays divided under them. Moreover, the process of conjecture and refutation is itself the primary theory threading these various essays together. The first division consists of Popper's own conjectures about the nature of scientific method, human knowledge, the nature of metaphysics, a theory of tradition, etc. The latter section: refutations of commonly held theories on the mind-body problem, the demarcation between science and metaphysics, language, and social philosophy. In this Routledge Classics edition there is a third section of addenda pertaining to just a few of the individual essays in the text.
For those who are unfamiliar Popper Conjectures and Refutations is probably one of the best ways to get to know him. Being a collection of essays originally published elsewhere, they are on varied themes. These themes are often inspired by a conference or publication, but despite the occasional aspect of these writings they all generally further the the falsifiability thesis of scientific theories. For Popper, this means that all theories, though they can not be "proved" by "experience" or "observation", that is empirically, they can be falsified by empirical means. This is the truly empirical nature of scientific thought and the scientific method. This empirical-ness of theories (or statements) is what makes them scientific. Unlike the early positivists argued, the empirical nature of the scientific method is not its ability to establish universal laws by the appeal to experience and the use of inductive reasoning. The appeal to observation and experience work to corroborate theoretical claims, but can never "prove" a theory once and for all.
Along the same lines, Popper's demarcation between science and metaphysics figures heavily in these essays. While science consists of testable theories/statements to be corroborated or falsified by experience, metaphysics is constituted by un-testable, non-falsifiable theories/statements. The un-testable, un-observable nature of metaphysical statements does not make them meaningless as Wittgenstein, Ayer, and others have argued - a universal claim about the nature of gravity is no way more meaningful - it simply makes them untestable, unfalsifiable, and unscientific.
The philosophy of science and scientific method are not all that is important to Popper. They do not even exhaust the topics discussed in this book. I could write (and have written elsewhere) pages and pages on Popper's polical philosophy, his critiques of historicism and scienticism, and his epistemology. If you want a proper introduction buy Conjectures and Refutations. You might want to consider his Poverty of Historicism as well.

an enjoyable book.......2002-11-29

The book is a collection of articles by Popper. It is easier to understand than his classic Logik der Forshung, and is much richer in content, for Popper embarks in some of these lectures on the history of philosophy and the history of science. There is also a delicious paper on self-reference and meaning in ordinary language.

I especially recommend the paper on "Scientific problems and their roots in metaphysics". Popper's conception of scientific dinamics as a sequence of big problems and answers to them makes him see continuity where experts on some particular philospher usually don't. Thus Popper sees a direct relation between Pythagoras, Plato and Euclid based on some fundamental cosmological problems. Euclid's Elements, Popper claims, were conceived by its author not as an excercise in pure geometry but as an organon of a theory of the world, designed to solve the problems of Plato's cosmology. Plato realized that Pythagoras' "arithmetical" theory of the world was in ruins after the discovery of irrational numbers, and that a new method was needed to understand the world. That is why he initiated the "gemoetrical" programme, which found its culmination in platonic Euclid's work. This way of seeing things is a bit unrealistic, a kind of free "rational reconstruction", but I think it is nevertheless a valuable view.

The fundamental lecture on philosophy of science in this collection is chapter 10, "Truth, rationality & the growth of scientific knowledge", where Popper presents his philosophy of science quite clearly and in detail. There has been a lot of water under the bridge since this paper was first published. His theory of "verisimilitude", for instance, was shown to be unmistakably wrong in the 1970s.

His approach to Tarski's theory of truth in that chapter is rather awkward: he pretends that Tarski's work showed what is meant by correspondence with the facts. To prove this, he appeals to instances of convention (T) and replacement of "is true" by "corresponds to the facts". Thus "snow is white" corresponds to the facts if and only if snow is white. But this might explain what it is for "snow is white" to correspond to the facts, but not what "correspondence with the facts" is. We cannot ascertain what that single property consists of, and surely Tarski's definiens for "truth" (i.e. "satisfaction by every infinite sequence") won't do the job.

Also, Popper's answer to the challenge that Duhem's problem posed on his philosophy is disappointing, the answer being something like "there exists a logical method of proving independence from axioms, so we might hopefully see from which axiomS the falied prediction depended; and even so, I admit that this method is usually difficult to apply; therefore holism is an untenable dogma."

The thesis of the book, says Popper, can be put like this: we can learn from our mistakes. This is held together with this other thesis: there is no ground for believeing any empirical statement to be true. The reader might wonder how Popper managed to believe in these two thesis at one and the same time. In Popper's view, science is this: conjecturing a theory to be true; subjecting this theory to criticism (empirical testing); this testing is done after experiment, but experiments are not reliable, we have no warrant that our perceptual apparatus is not deceiving us; if the theory fails the test, we reject it; but "it" is a whole system of related theories, even observational theories (even logic and mathematics, says Quine); and then we have to guess which of these we have to reject. The risk of taking a true theory to be false is certainly very high, as high as that of taking a false theory to be true. So I don't see how Popper can be so confident that we can learn from mistakes. Perhaps if we purged Popper's methodology of things like truth (not to mention verisimilitude), we could get a methodology of science conceived as a canon of critical procedure, with no claims as to what we are achieving when we abide by it.

The article on hegelian Dialectics is amusing. It tries the impossible task of explaining dialectics in a simple language, and then to refute it. The dialectician's typical reply to this kind of criticism is: you used clear language, so that is NOT Hegel's diatectics.

As I said, this is a highly stimulating and clearly written book, which deserves to be read even if many things in it must to be corrected or complemented.

Hypothesis-Attempt to Falsify- Conclude-Repeat!.......2002-11-27

It is rare these days to read a proper treatment of science. Bookshelves in the "science" sections are filled with astronomy, biology, chemistry and such. Not to suggest their is anything wrong with these disciplines; it's just that science is a way of thinking, or if you will, a method- not a collection of beliefs.

Karl Popper has been largely misunderstood, being labeled a relativist and destroyer of objective science. To be sure, he did believe, as the reader will find in this enjoyable collection, that all theories- even well corroborated, are tentative. To give his critics more ammo, Popper considers science "reasoned myth-making." Neither of these extend to relativism. If theories are tentative- always subject to new and different tests- a theory can never be fully proved but CAN be fully falsified. This is the essence of the books essays. Whether Popper is discussing the pre-socratic philosophers, social science or demarcation, his falsification theory is the common theme here. As for the "reasoned myth-making," Popper has a bone to pick with those who think that science is purely based on observation. Any theory, by necessity, is a generality and there are no generalities in nature. Theories are made by observation + induction and induction, as Popper will add, is never logically - only psychologically - justified This is another common thread of the essays.

Two suggestions for reading this book. First, if you are a Popper critic, you NEED to read this book as he goes a long way in explaining many beliefs of his that critics get wrong. Second, do not read the book front to back. As all of these 500+ pages are on the falsification theory applied to different situations, it will get extremely repetitive. Read a few essays at a time and come back later.

The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge Classics)
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The fallacy of Utopian Engineering

The Poverty of Anti-Historicism?

A slim volume with a powerful punch

Gives inspiring ideas and insights into the history.

The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge Classics)
Karl Popper
Manufacturer: Routledge
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The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge Classics)

The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics)

Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

ASIN: 0415278465

Book Description

Hailed on publication in 1957 as "probably the only book published this year that will outlive the century," this is a brilliant of the idea that there are fixed laws in history and that human beings are able to predict them.

Customer Reviews:

Amazon reader.......2004-05-03

Do you have a deep down, hard to enunciate, disquiet with the level of debate in the broad area of social theory and "social engineering"? Do you feel that many of the claims and pronouncements made by social theorists (of any political disposition) are unjustified, but do not really know why you feel that way? If so, this book is a useful starting point for an examination of the problem.

In it, Popper develops the argument that "Historicism" (the term has more than one meaning in different contexts) as he defines it is a flawed approach, and that it is not a justifiable base for the sweeping claims of the historicist. To Popper, historicism is the concept that, by examination of history, we are able to define the rules that govern social change and hence are able to predict those changes. His initial impetus to look into this area was a critical evaluation of Marx - see his essay "How I became a philosopher without really trying" published in "All life is problem solving".

In its simplest form, Popper's argument is the observation that observation of the past does not allow one to accurately predict the future. This may seem to be a fairly obvious statement, but it is worth keeping in mind as he develops the various arguments that make up the case for and against historicism.

Popper's philosophy is often overlooked, perhaps because he attempts to limit himself to goals that he can reasonably achieve. He is a very prominent figure in the philosophy of science, and much of his epistemology relates to the methodology of the empirical sciences, and hence to direct observation, and the relationship of observation to development and testing of theories. Perhaps because he is not too ambitious, his philosophy is less "sexy". It is, however, eminently reasonable, and avoids many of the great stumbling blocks of traditional Western philosophy - for example, the problem of induction and infinite regress.

This book is non-technical, and is accessible to those with little formal philosophical training. It addresses the dominant paradigm in social engineering, and suggests why we may be unhappy with that paradigm.

The fallacy of Utopian Engineering.......2002-10-19

Sir Popper is considered one of the most important thinkers in the area of philosophy of science. "The Poverty of Historicism" despite its complexity, carries a fundamental simple message: prediction over the course of history (its social and economic implications) is nothing more than a fantasy, an illusion. And this assertion is based on the principle that the events/persons responsible for changes are themselves affected by these same changes. It is Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty applied to social sciences!
Historicism is the theory that history develops itself according to pre-determined, inexorable laws with a fixed objective or end. Fascism and communism were laid upon these presuppositions, and the course fo history has proven the fallacy (therefore poverty) of such assumptions. The attempt to have a holistic approach by eliminating individual differences through "brain washing" is incompatible with critical thought, and although it will bring about a concentration of power it will also cause an erosion of knowledge. The Poverty of Historicism becomes a poverty of imagination, of the ability of critical judgement and analysis. Historicism, according to Karl Popper preposterously assumes the postion of having discovered the problem of "change," but revolutions are not unique to our modern era and the metaphysical speculation of what constitutes "change" has been addressed since the time of Heraclitus.
The goal of applying scientific methods with the same accuracy and predictability as those in theoretical physics is bound to end in failure when it concerns the course of history. The influence of the prediction upon the predicted events is here being termed as the "Oedipus effect." Physics can arrive at universally valid uniformities, whereas sociology must be contented with the intuitive understanding of unique events, and of the role they play in particular situations, occuring within particular struggles of interests, tendencies and destinies. If sociological laws determine the degree of anything, they will do so only in very vague terms, and will permit, at the best, a very rough scaling.
Karl Popper who was a fierce advocate of democrary and social critiscim, dedicated this book to all of those who have been victims to the fascist and communist belief in the inexorable laws of historical destiny.

The Poverty of Anti-Historicism?.......2001-05-09

This classic little work is a must read for any theorist of history and evolution, which is not to say that one agrees altogether with Popper's formulation. Reflecting Popper's experience both with issues of scientific methodology and the ideologies of scientism, the work ends in a paradoxical mode with respect to the idea of a science of history and/or evolution. The invisible influence of the antinomies of Kantian critical thought buttress the basic argument, as it transforms the term 'historicism' itself from its nineteenth century usage into something different, in a confusion of terminology that does not invalidate the basic thrust. Popper's insight remains fundamental even if the implied usage directed at more rigid forms of Marxism narrows its scope. We live in an age that has reinvented the fallacy of (Popperian)historicism in the search for causal social theories of all types, and the results are always in the same difficulty that Popper points to. If a deterministic theory bent on predicting the future fails for the reasons Popper gives,the implication that there can be no genuine 'universal history' fails as a necessary consequence. For such a history might embrace rather than be contradicted by Popper's argument, leaving us to wonder if there is not also a certain poverty to 'anti-historicism' in the sense of throwing out the baby with the bath, i.e. finding history to be without meaning! In any case, a classic little work. The section on the "Oedipus Effect" invokes the tragic theme, with Popper as a sort of theoretical Tiresias, grizzled and omimous. Read.

A slim volume with a powerful punch.......2000-06-24

I read this book, and several of Karl Popper's other books then available in English, while still a graduate student in anthropology at an American university. While neither my dissertation committee members nor even my fellow graduate students were much interested in my attempts to bring Popper's arguments to their attention, I found his work to be exhilarating for its clarity, courage, and fairmindedness. Thirty-plus years later, I still do.

Gives inspiring ideas and insights into the history........1998-02-24

This book is not your easy bedtime reading -- it's serious and requires a reader's thought to travel along the author's walks and remember his points. But the rewards are big -- Popper comes close to defining the method of the field I would call "societal engineering".

Popper's main points to me are:

1. You can't plan and carry out a reform of the whole society. Reason - the people who carry out reforms are themselves changed by reforms. They loose relative objectivity and can no longer see clearly the original plan of reform and follow it.

2. You can plan and carry out changes in a relatively small sector or in a narrow field. Reason - it's possible to receive objective feedback and act on it to steer the reform into the objectives of the original plan.

Examples from Soviet history that startled me:

1. A failure of Lenin and Bolsheviks to change society. They created a plan and did they try -- but the resulting system (in which I was born) instead of changing according to plan, just fed them the data their plans required. Even more almost all the originators of changes were destroyed by these changes.

2. A relative success of the NEP (New Economic Politics) initiated by Lenin and his associates. It dealt with relatively narrow field - small to middle businesses and it had definite goal -- to feed hungry country of the post-World War I Soviet Russia. And it did succeed! The NEP was stopped by Stalin, who unsuccessfully continued to implement plans to change whole society.

In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years
Average customer rating:

Scientist; Humanist: Critical Rationalist

An enlightened defense of tolerance and reason

In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years
Karl Popper
Manufacturer: Routledge
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

20th Century | British | World Literature | Literature & Fiction | Subjects | Books
Consciousness & Thought | Philosophy | Nonfiction | Subjects | Books
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Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach

All Life is Problem Solving

ASIN: 0415135486

Book Description

In Search of a Better World collects Karl Popper's meditations on the real improvements science has wrought in society, in politics and in the arts in the course of the twentieth century.

His subjects range from the beginnings of scientific speculation in classical Greece to the destructive effects of twentieth century totalitarianism,from major figures of the Enlightenment such as Kant and Voltaire to the role of science and self-criticism in the arts. The essays offer striking new insights into the mind of one of the greatest twentieth century philosophers.

Customer Reviews:

Scientist; Humanist: Critical Rationalist.......2003-02-09

The burden of being a philosopher that says something both new and counter-intuitive is that throughout one's career, you end up repeating yourself, re-clarifying your arguments to the endless number of critcs that misunderstand you. In Popper's case, the views advanced were that all knowldedge must be held as tentative and that real intellectual progress comes not from verifying true theories (which can never be 'for sure) but in falsifying and eliminating old ones (which you only need to do once). The critics misinterpreted and Popper did repeat himself time and time again.

This is one of the very few bad things about the book. Honestly, if you've read Popper before (Conjectures and Refutations, Objective Knowledge, Logic of Scientific Discovery) this book will have little, if any, to add. If you've not, this is a great introduction.

There are 3 sections: On Knowledge, On History and a section for miscellaneous essays. The first section touches on Popper's views on how we recieve, criticize, falsify and act on knowledge. The second is an expansion of the first. Here, Popper focuses on historical events hee deems important: Immanuel Kant's phiosophical formulation, the invention of the book. He also gets a tad bit into politics, where a liberal democracy is preferred.

It is the third section, though, that is the payoff. Essays ranging in diversity from "How I See Philosophy" to "What Does The West Believe In". The best essay in the book, "Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility", is a critical rationalist's look at the role of intellectuals (Popper carefully avoids snobbery here) role in perpetuating a tolerant, non-violent society. As crucial now in '03 as when he gave the lecture in '82.

To conclude, if you are new to Popper, this is a good intro (but Conjectures and Refutations or Popper Selections might still be better. If you've read those or much other Popper before, you will probably find yourself able to guess what Popper says in each essay without much problem. You can safely skip this one.

An enlightened defense of tolerance and reason.......1998-12-15

This book was my first exposure to Popper's philosophy, which I have since found to be consistently convincing, enlightening, and inspiring. In the face of fashionable twentieth-century irrationalism and associated political fanaticisms, Popper stresses the importance of intellectual modesty, rational discourse, non-violence, tolerance, and an open society. In this series of collected essays Popper makes a lucid and compelling case for a philosophy that accepts that all of our knowledge is conjectural and uncertain, but that this, far from leading to irrationality, makes science and reason the best tools we have for confronting the universe that surrounds us. In contrast with the impenetrable, self-important nonsense of many modern philosophers, Popper writes with a refreshing simplificity and modesty. A truly beautiful and extraordinary book.

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