Meredith, George

Average customer rating:

When?
Wonderful Analysis but Strange Conclusion
History does not repeat itself
Too Bad It's out of Print
Great analysis, wild-eyed inconsistent final chapter

Coming War With Japan
George Friedman , and Meredith Lebard
Manufacturer: St Martins Pr
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0312076770

Customer Reviews:

When?.......2006-03-23

Still waiting....? Another failed post-cold war attempt at 'Mr X' (or Mr and Mrs X??) status...

Wonderful Analysis but Strange Conclusion.......2004-12-17

Heres an interesting book that has been somewhat discredited over time. Still, the analysis is excellent and worth considering.

The basic theme is that Japan and the United States could become opponents again with the end of the Cold War. The titanic battle against communism required Japan and the United States to come to an understanding. Basically, Japan was to manufacture goods, allow the US basing privileges and provide some defensive capability by patrolling the airspace and ocean immediately surrounding Japan. In return, the Unites States would guarantee Japan access to natural resources and provide for Japan's military defense. With the Cold War over, this arrangement has become economically unsound for the US to continue. A new political arrangement must be developed.

The authors show how Japan must have access to material resources from Asia and the Middle East to continue as a strong nation. They also reveal that Japan could probably aquire this access on its own through new alliances (especially with India) and by rebuilding its military. This would put Japan in conflict with the US since America needs control of the Western Pacific to feel stable.

The analysis leading up to the conclusion is inspiring. Friedman and Lebard boil down Japanese and US strategic interests and show how these needs are (or could be) met. They also show us how Japan could quickly rebuild its military forces.

As a prior post reveals, the conclusion is less than stellar in some aspects. They think Japan should ally itself with North Korea. Fat chance of that even before the Kim Dynasty started lobbing nuke capable missiles in Japan's direction! Another point that seems strange is the idea they put forward of placing a US armored division in South Korea. Why? The terrain just isnt right for large tank units.

The conflict the authors envision has not occurred for many reasons. As I noted above, they didnt factor in North Korea very well. Also, they didnt forsee Tokyo's economic bust. Even so, you can see some of the elements they discussed in motion today. A good example is the growing pressure in Japan to remove the Marines from Okinawa. This wouldnt have happened during the Cold War.

The authors missed some critical points in their analysis. Still, they did seem to capture many of the post-Cold War pressures we see today in Northeast Asia.

History does not repeat itself.......2002-07-06

The authors' central point is that the events leading to the war in the Pacific (1937-1945) are (contemporary to the early 90s) repeating themselves, and that another war between the U.S. and Japan is imminent. The proof of this is there, and incredibly accurate, but the authors' have failed to grasp the emotional and sociological reasons why that war will not come. As an analysis of the causes of WWII in the Pacific, and why Japan's economy suddenly fell apart in the late 90s, this book is as good as it gets -- just don't buy their predictions.

Too Bad It's out of Print.......2001-01-23

Even though this book is getting older, it's worth finding it at your library and giving it a read. The Friedmans see the world returning to more classic, zero-sum balance-of-power relationships in the post-Cold War context. This is even the case as regional, multilateral, and global international institutions develop. Since the nation-state system is still the most legitimate actor in these relationships, it seems that final equations of national interests will be the utlimate determinants of peace, war, and wealth in the coming decades.

This is an important consideration to understand if we are interested in looking at the world as a set of relationships that are more than public relations gestures [Kissinger's, 'Diplomacy' is also essential].

This 'Coming War With Japan,' identifies a set of mutually incompatible needs of both the United States and Japan that will ultimately define their relationship in the absence of the Soviet threat. China certainly understand this as well. These needs dwell in the economic and strategic spheres, much of it centering around energy needs.

The value of the Friedmans' approach -what makes their other book, 'The Future of War,' equally good- is to present these issues within a broad, historical context that gives us a perspective that isn't limited by the current context of our relationship. Even if you think that any differences between Japan and the United States can ultimately be resolved without was or economic conflict or else obscured by the growing prominence of China, this book still provides a useful perspective on the United States' relationship with Japan and its interests in the region.

Great analysis, wild-eyed inconsistent final chapter.......1998-12-04

The analysis of where post-Cold War politics is going is insightful and profound. Unfortunately, the alleged trigger for the coming war, European (non-) Union of 1992 has its roots in Cold War politics. Friedman used the dissipation of Cold War politics as the rationale for the coming impotence and disintegration of Cold War institutions (ie NATO). The EU is a child of Cold War politics; therefore the failing of successful integration should have been anticipated. Ergo, the "coming war" loses it's trigger. Still, the analysis is sound and I will be purchasing subsequent books from Friedman.

The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-first Century

Average customer rating:

Worth the Read
Entertaing, thought-provoking, but kind of silly
Technological Determism
Worthwhile, but flawed, work
A must read for any military officer

The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-first Century
George Friedman , and Meredith Friedman
Manufacturer: St. Martin's Griffin
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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Transformation of War

ASIN: 0312181000

Book Description

The Future of War makes a brilliant case that the twenty-first century, even more than the twentieth, will be the American century, and that America's global dominance will be associated with a revolution in weaponry and warfare as basic as the one that arose with the development of gunpowder five hundred years ago. From the era of flintlocks and cannons to the day of automatic weapons and heavy artillery, the waging of war-while undeniably changing in many aspects-has continued to rely on the technology that began with the use of black powder to expel a projectile through a tube.In The Future of War, the authors argue that this Age of Ballistics is ending and we are entering a fundamentally new period, the Age of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), the so-called smart weapons that will antiquate the traditional way of making war. Where guns and artillery are inherently inaccurate and need to be fired thousands of times to hit one target, these new projectiles are precise and lethally efficient; while ballistic weapons platforms must be brought within range of the battlefield, PGMs can devastate from any distance. The authors show how the innovations in weapons technology will affect America's defense strategies on land and sea, in air and in space, reshaping our military forces, while confronting us with new strategic challenges as America enters the twenty-first century as the dominant power on the globe.

Customer Reviews:

Worth the Read.......2005-07-24

Friedman has done a wonderful job of laying a broad overview of US techno-politico power and policy plans for the new millenium. He has not however fully discussed the appalling breach of security that our own US based companies are guilty of committing. China has now armed themselves with advanced missile technologies that representatives and technicians of many US firms have given away. This is not only an insane and profoundly stupid act of retardation but an act of treason. Every one of these people that devulged these secrets, however casually, should be publically executed as an example.

Because of these breaches, the US is now in the midst of radically and most wisely changing its war policies. What we read about is of course the things that are known and what the government wants us to either know or feels is not a threat in having it known. My only hope in the development of conventional weaponry, we are not merely drawing plans but have the capacity to make a new George Lucas film look like a cheap gimic trick and can take out our enemeies whole sale if need be.

Kruschev and Mao Tse-Tung reportedly boasted that the West would sell them the rope that they would then use to hang the West. Like fools, we've sold them yards of rope. Hopefully we've invented something quite clever to make this proverbial rope obsolete and useless.

The current poltiically correct culture would have us idiotically believe the vacuous notion that our enemies share our same value system and that there is no need to prepare for war and so doing is provocative. But freedom has never been free--ever. Our enemeies spit on our values and would indeed hang us with the rope we've provided because of that foolish liberal sentiment that everyone is fundamentally good with that world-can-be-as-one Coca-Cola-motto philosophy.

These are most dangerous times indeed and our enemies still see power coming from the capacity to do violence.

"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
-Mao Tse-Tung

Entertaing, thought-provoking, but kind of silly.......2005-07-21

"The Future of War" predicts US dominance of warfare throughout the 21st Century, as a result of US advanced technology in general and precision weaponry in particular. Their train of thought has considerable merit, and deserves reading and thoughtful attention. However, the book suffers from the same two major flaws as most books by visionaries without enough practical experience: misunderstanding of specific happenings in the past, and unlikely projections into the far future. Having been involved with US defense for 50 years, as a member of the military, as a designer and developer and advisor on US weaponry, and as an advisor on strategic, operational and tactical issues, I read this book with considerable amusement, although I do take seriously much of what it says. I shall give specifics on two failures to understand the details of the past, and then offer criticism of two of the book's projections, as examples.

Past episode #1: The 1991 precision strikes against Iraq. There is no doubt that our air strikes and land attacks in the 1991 campaign to liberate Kuwait were exceedingly effective, and there is no doubt that this effectiveness was largely due to our precision weaponry. However, to do precision strikes, whether with airborne munitions or ground forces, it's necessary to know what targets to attack, where they are, and what weapons are likely to be effective against a particular target. In the 1991 campaign, this effort was undertaken by the "Jeddi Knights", largely under the guidance of Col. John Warden. The key role of the "Jeddi Knights" was to establish priorities and mission profiles for which targets to strike when with what munitions, and they did this extraordinarily well. What the Friedmans obviously don't know is the amount of detailed information that was available to the "Jeddi Knights", carefully acquired over the 70 years preceding the campaign, first by the British until about 1950, and thereafter by the US military. The armed forces of major powers assume they may have to fight wars on short notice aganst opponents who have been designated shortly before by national authorities, so they invest a great deal in gathering information pertinent to how various campaigns might be conducted. In the case of Iraq, the British did very careful mapping from 1920 until about 1950, producing "ordnance" maps of higher detail and accuracy than exist even for some parts of the United States, and these were invaluable to planners. Then, starting in about 1950, when it began to seem possible that the US might someday have to fight somewhere in the Middle East, the US military carefully gathered information relevant to how a campaign might be fought, and which potential enemy targets should be candidates for destruction. These studies resided in US intelligence and military archives until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and were then used as the basis for planning the campaign.

Two examples of this. First, the destruction of certain bridges was given high priority not to impede vehicular movement, but to sever the communications cables running under the bridges; our planners knew which cables important to Iraqi Command and Control were buried too deeply to destroy easily except where they were routed under bridges, and therefore which bridges to take out to disrupt Iraqi military communications. Second, the swing by US, British and French forces far to the West, the "Hail Mary" gambit, would not have been possible in that harsh terrain unless viable routes for armor and supply vehicles were known, and the Iraqi Army either didn't know of such routes or didn't believe we could know of them. There are exactly two feasible routes, and both were used; they can both be determined in complete detail from careful study of the British Ordnance maps prepared in the 1930s, and (although I wasn't involved in the campaign planning) I had no difficulty in finding and plotting the only two feasible routes before the ground campaign began, from the good maps in my possession. I also understand why it was necessary to bring the two prototype JSTARS systems to the theatre, to detect and allow blocking of any Iraqi strike intended to sever the Tapline Road; this was also evident from the maps.

By contrast, we had no success at all in locating and destroying mobile Scud missile launchers, because they moved around with great frequency. If you don't know where something is, no precision of your weaponry, and no amount of technical sophistication or military skill, will allow you to destroy it.

Past example #2: The SAFEGUARD BMD system. The Friedmans say, on the basis of assertions by people who may or may not be experts, that SAFEGUARD was deactivated because it wouldn't work. In fact the situation was exactly the reverse, but one must know the purpose of SAFEGUARD and its mode of operation to understand what actually happened. The mission of SAFEGUARD was to prevent complete success of a Soviet counterforce first strike against our Minuteman ICBM fields, by opening a "launch window" for a retaliatory strike by the Minuteman missiles in the face of a full-scale Soviet strike. I helped to plan and design that system, and it would have done what it was intended to, although at a horrible increased toll of death and destruction, which I dreaded, but could see no alternative to in the face of rapidly increasing Soviet capability. Far more important than the fact that we knew SAFEGUARD would work was the fact that the Soviets concluded it would work; that realization brought them back to the bargainng table at the Helsinki talks, and led to the SALT I treaty, which I rejoiced about. Provisions of that treaty made SAFEGUARD unnecessary, and that's why the one completed SAFEGUARD site was deactivated and construction on the other sites was stopped.

Also on the subject of balistic missile defense, the Friedmans assert that midcourse discrimination and destruction of incoming warheads is infeasible. This is simply not true, although there is an exceedingly serious problem associated with doing it. I know three quite different ways of doing midcourse discrimintion and destruction of enemy incoming warheads, and, given that I've been out of that business for more than 10 years, I expect that other ways are known by now. The problem is that, at least for the three ways I know, one is politically unacceptable to the US Congress and the US public, one is so expensive that it's unlikely Congress would ever fund it, and the third, if fully developed, would be usable for certain other military purposes that would probably lead to a renewed arms race as our potential major opponents sought to counter it. (I was one of a small group of scientists who successfully recommended to Congress that development of that third approach be stopped, to avoid the resulting foreseeable escalation; scientists and military professionals, despite various comments in the Friedmans' book, work closely together over years and decades, and come to have considerable knowledge of each other's fields.) Whether at some future time it may become desirable to develop and deploy a BMD system that does midcourse discrimination and destruction of warheads is a political and diplomatic question to be decided by the public and its elected leaders, on which I have no insight, but it is technically feasible.

Now, turning to the future, what the Friedmans fail to understand in their glowing vision of US technology dominating future warfare, is that for every technical advance, opponents can devise at least partial countermeasures, and that therefore no amount of technology as such can determine the outcome of a campaign. The Coalition conquest of Iraq in 2003 provides an excellent example. Although large parts of the Iraqi army, and all of its top leadership, was utterly incompetent, other large parts of the Iraqi army were composed of thoroughly trained officers and enlisted men, who fully understood that if they confronted US forces nose to nose, they would be destroyed. Understanding this, very many of the best Iraqi units simply demobilized themsleves and disappeared into the civilian population as Coalition forces approached, in many cases taking their weaponry with them. One entire Iraqi division near the border with Iran totally vanished before we got to its bases; everyone from the division commander to the most junior private. Professional soldiers, even if motivated to fight, have no more desire than anyone else to be killed pointlessly in a situation where they are unable to resist effectively.

A substantial fraction of these well-trained, motivated Iraqi forces subsequently emerged as part of the resistance movement that continues in Iraq. How many of the resistance fighters come from that crowd is obviously impossible to know for sure, but my personal estimate is that about 30,000 of Saddam Hussein's best and most loyal troops and officers became part of the resistance movement. And our overwhelming superiority in all aspects of conventional warfare have been far less effective against current Iraqi resistance methods; the resistance movement seems to be gradually weakening and fragmenting, but it's a long slow process, in which our precision weapons and our advanced communications and intelligence give us far less of an advantage than they do in conventional warfare.

There are various other gaps in the Friedmans' assessment of the future. I'll mention only two of many. First, vircators, often touted as the most effective weapon of the 21st Century, have had only relatively diappointing results so far. Why? Partly because technical improvements to vircators are needed; those will surely come along in due course. Much more serious is the fact that battle damage asssessment after a vircator strike is at present almost impossible to do with any degree of accuracy, so after a target has been attacked with one or more vircators, there is no practical way to know whether the strike was successful or not.
Presumably some day we will overcome this particular problem, but it illustrates that new and potentially formidable technology may find relatively little application because of purely tactical and operational problems that arise in using it.

As my second example, I'll remark on the Friedmans' vision of US infantrymen as being in effect "cocooned" in future to protect them from the enemy's weapons. This vision ignores two serious problems. First, no "cocoon" imaginable can protect an infantryman against certain weapons such as a fuel-air bomb if the enemy knows approximately where the infantryman is. Second, and closely related, anyone with substantial experience in concealing himself in a hostile environment, including me, knows all too well that the more accoutrements one has, the harder it is to hide and not be observed. In light clothing and carrying only light personal weapons, I can disappear into the landscape almost anywhere, and move around unnoticed; burdened with excess equipment and elaborate protective clothing, only certain carefully selected spots can offer concealment. Everyone with experience in this matter knows as much as I do on this subject, so infantrymen whose lives depend on not being observed will move far more cautiously when heavily burdened than when lightly armed and lightly protected. That doesn't mean infantry should be sent into combat inadequately equipped, but it does mean that the increased effectiveness of some given number of trained infantry when provided with extra combat capability and protective equipment is far less than one might otherwise suppose.

I could cite dozens of other matters, past and projected, which the Friedmans book misunderstands or overlook, but this is enough. I'll just say that the book is an excellent source of ideas, but should be viewed with practiced skepticism.

Technological Determism.......2002-05-18

This is an extremely well written book on technological determism. It shows the development of weapon systems through centuries. And shows how these systems have been replaced by new technology.

Technological determism advocates that technology controls the development of society, and that this process is unstoppable. It is closely related to the school of realism.

Even if you disagree with technological determism, this book is valuable to understand how many strategists, politicians, scientists and generals do think.

Worthwhile, but flawed, work.......2001-08-10

In light the number of stars I have given this book, I feel I should start off be stating that there is tremendous merit in this work. The authors do a superb job of pointing out the root causes of warfare, and why it is naïve to expect that armed conflict has gone by the wayside. They then go on to point out the challenges to American global preeminence, and what needs to be done to assure it.

Specifically they look to precision-guided munitions as the key weapons of future combat, and space as its primary battleground. They make compelling arguments for each, particularly regarding the obsolescence of the primary weapons of today's Pax Americana: the tank, the strategic bomber, and the aircraft carrier. Furthermore, the completely debunk the myth of nuclear supremacy on the modern battlefield.

The problems with this book that I alluded to are twofold. First, the editing is appalling; there are numerous typos and misprints (for example, referring to a torpedo that can travel at 400 knots). While the knowledgeable reader can usually infer what the authors' intent is, editorial errors always make for a frustrating reading experience.

The second concern cuts to the heart of the book. While the authors do a superb job of defining the future battlefield, they offer very little in terms of how we get there from where we currently stand. The weapons systems they describe will almost certainly come to pass, but they neither make suggestions as to the allocation of R&D dollars, nor offer any sense of what research should receive priority. In the absence of such commentary, their bold assertions frequently seem more like dogma than scholarship. Moreover, they ignore potential doctrinal changes that might extend the service life of current weapons systems while increasing their effectiveness.

At its best, `The Future of War' is a visionary look into the future of armed conflict. The authors correctly grasp the dawning senility of the weapons currently deployed, and paint a bold picture of what the future battlefield will look like. Unfortunately, while brilliantly describing the future, they completely ignore the near to middle term. As a result, `The Future of War' while well worth reading, can only be treated as half of an equation. One must read the works of authors like Leonhard and MacGregor to truly appreciate the shape of the modern battlefield.

A must read for any military officer.......2001-08-02

This guy could be the next Clauswitz. To my knowledge, most of his theories and ideas are totally unique and represent a new field in military knowledge. The part about weapon senility is pure genius, and something anyone in a position to determine our future weapons systems MUST read. He also breaks new ground with his theories about the future of Space, long-range weapons systems, and the uselessness of nuclear weapons. This book is fascinating for anyone interested in military affairs.

The Intelligence Edge: How to Profit in the Information Age

Average customer rating:

Outstanding Resource and Reference Book
Excellent Book for REAL Practitioners in the Art
This is a ridiculous, trivial book.

The Intelligence Edge: How to Profit in the Information Age
George Friedman , Meredith Friedman , Colin Chapman , and John Baker
Manufacturer: Crown
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-first Century
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Coming War With Japan

ASIN: 0609600753
Release Date: 1997-10-28

Amazon.com

The Intelligence Edge: How to Profit in the Information Age is a tightly focused primer that details ways to intelligently and systematically gather the specific type of data that can boost profitability in virtually any company. George Friedman, Meredith Friedman, Colin Chapman, and John S. Baker Jr.--four experts on intelligence-gathering techniques--identify the primary sources for such information and outline an eight-step formula for acquiring, prioritizing, and utilizing it. The Intelligence Edge discusses legal questions that can arise, and possible sources of assistance and tools (including the Net) that will aid in the process.

Book Description

Knowledge is power, and today's age of information calls for new ways of attaining and controlling knowledge. Your business can get an edge over its competitors by being able to find essential information quickly and efficiently. Whether you are an independent entrepreneur or the CEO of a multinational corporation, intelligence gathering will play an increasingly important role in your business's strategic decision-making process.

The Intelligence Edge provides you with tools honed by the world's premier intelligence-gathering professionals. The authors show how to use techniques perfected by such organizations as the CIA on how to find and collect, prioritize, and analyze data. They present a comprehensive system of information management that will teach you how to identify and target different sources of information, from the library to the internet to company gossip. Because some information is expensive or difficult to access, you will learn how to use your time and resources in the most efficient way possible. Then, once you have collected the information you need, you will be shown how to use it--what to store, what to discard, what to turn to your advantage. By following these steps, you can learn to compete and prosper in today's knowledge-based business environment.

Whether you work for yourself or for a major multinational corporation, The Intelligence Edge will help you and your company to survive and prosper in today's knowledge-based business environment. Stay ahead of the information wave with:

Techniques perfected by intelligence organizations
Advice on how to find the information you need quickly and efficiently
Methods on how to sort and analyze the information
Guides to the best databases, libraries, and on-line services

Customer Reviews:

Outstanding Resource and Reference Book.......1998-10-01

As an investment banking anaylst, one of my primary jobs is build financial models of the companies we evaluate. One of the most underrated and (in my view) more important element of my work comes when we perform due diligence and understand the soundness of the assumptions we build into our models. Most analysts (in my experience) are too infatuated with their sophisticated spreadsheets and believe the sheer complexity of their models can compensate for a lack of understanding of the fundamental business they are set to evaluate.

The book does an outstanding job of articulating, at every step, the importance of challenging one's assumptions and systematically gathering, synthesizing, and =analyzing= information that helps to dig through the colored lenses of wishful thinking or purely numerical analysis. The occasional injection of humor is quite welcome - in a world of stuffy self-important books on business, here's a piece of work that was written by people who love what they do, and are adept at making you better at what you do as well.

Excellent Book for REAL Practitioners in the Art.......1998-07-21

I work as a professional performing due diligence for VC firms and client companies in Seattle and Silicon Valley. I have been using many of the techniques for several years that enable me to rapidly assess business opportunities and develop turnaround strategies. I am also a member of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals.

What this book did was enable me to enhance my business process and better articulate this extremely difficult line of work. For example, the business process outlined on page 58 is crucial in that it identifies several "Stop" or check points with clients. Key in this type of consulting, especially where steps you take as a consultant may directly add risk to your client, it is important to know where to draw the line and involve them for a decision. The authors clarify where the key decision points are when it comes to going from passive to semi-active, to active intelligence gathering. Critical, as time is money to you. But! to the client, information - or exposure thereof also means risk that could become your liability.

Consultants in this field are in the knowledge business, and one of the most difficult things to do is get the client to place a value on knowledge or intelligence. The authors, through wit and excellent real-world examples, spell out some of the keys to getting paid!! (pp 67). Naturally, this would go over the head of the casual reader who has never practiced and is looking for a "cook book" approach to due diligence of new business opportunities (i.e. see above commentary from Bogota).

This book is a "how to" book in that the authors have taken the time to clarify and rank several research tools and locations that one might not normally be aware of. This comparison alone is worth the money, as anyone who has used the web for performing research would agree.

The real brilliance in this book is subtle. By connecting the examples, you learn how to ask questions and iden! tify with what is important in doing intelligence research.! Again, for anyone who has gone in circles with clients who "don't know what they don't know", or worse yet, don't know how to value knowledge - this is critical to delivering fast, and minimizing your exposure.

Frankly, the Bogota guy didn't get it and has probably never performed true business intelligence. I agree that the coverage of the Internet web search engines, which used the example of finding information on pagers, is old news. The chapter's purpose was to show how more advanced tools outside of the Internet, such as Nexis, are preferred substitutes. That point was clearly made. However, this example was only used among 10 pages of chapter 5 (which was taken up with images of why the web doesn't work). The other 257 pp of this book are the meat.

My hats off to the authors for delivering a humorous text based on real-world wisdom that cuts through a very gray area that is as difficult to perform, as it is to explain.

This is a ridiculous, trivial book........1998-02-10

In this book, one can learn that: The internet started as a Defense Department project in the 80's p. 120 The proper way to search for pager manufacturing in internet web search engines is just to mention "pager", and not worry at all about other key words or symbols. p. 124 That, according to an intelligence project, pager repair could be a great business. p.139 I was lead to believe by a book review that this book would give me a great deal of information about passive intelligence gathering. It does not live up to its promise, and lacks credibility for so many factual (1,1969 2, +pager +manufacture + industry +trends ) and analytical (3 I threw my cell phone away, and got another for free)errors. What a shame.

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The Shaving of Shagpat
George Meredith
Manufacturer: Ballantine
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
ASIN: 034501958X

Comedy: An Essay on Comedy, by George Meredith; Laughter, by Henri Bergson

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Comedy: An Essay on Comedy, by George Meredith; Laughter, by Henri Bergson
George, and Bergson, Henri; Sypher, Wylie (Introduction by) Meredith
Manufacturer: Doubleday Anchor Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Mass Market Paperback
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Poems By George Meredith
George Meredith
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Like to some deep-chested organ whose grand inspiration, Serenely majestic in utterance, lofty and calm, Interprets to mortals with melody great as its burthen The mystical harmonies chiming for ever throughout the bright spheres.

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Modern Love
George Meredith
Manufacturer: Kessinger Publishing, LLC
ProductGroup: Book
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ASIN: 1425467059

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THIS 56 PAGE ARTICLE WAS EXTRACTED FROM THE BOOK: Poems by George Meredith, by George Meredith. To purchase the entire book, please order ISBN 1417930691.

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One of the finest novels of the Victorian century
A Great Comedy of Manners

The Egoist (A Norton Critical Edition)
George Meredith
Manufacturer: W. W. Norton & Company
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Customer Reviews:

One of the finest novels of the Victorian century.......2001-09-03

Meredith's masterpiece is woefully underread, and it is a sad truth that the Norton scholarly edition is the only edition of THE EGOIST now in print. This is not an easy read, however: Meredith's caustic dialogue foreshadows henry James's in its mastery of ambiguities, and his witty paradoxes surpass even Oscar Wilde (who admitted his debt to Meredith). The plot is a simple one: the wealthy handsome and titled Sir Willoughby Patterne, having been jilted by one fiancée, proposes to another young woman, the intelligent and intensely likeable Clara Middleton, who accepts him; before very long, Clara has realized what a monstrous egoist Sir Willoughby is, but not after it seems too late for her to go back on her word. This is one of the most brilliant studies of mortification ever accomplished, and what makes it all the more amazing is that Meredith clearly modelled Sir Willoughby in part on himself and the extraordinarily sympathetic Clara on his wife, Mary Ellen Peacock, who deserted Meredith for another man. This book is funny, thought-provoking, and exceptionally poignant: there are moments when you read it that your heart will go into your stomach as you sympathize with Clara's appalling plight.

A Great Comedy of Manners.......2000-06-14

This is one of the funniest novels I've ever read. The basic story is simple: Sir Willoughby Patterne's betrothal to the young Clara Middleton is threatened when she realizes his enormous love of himself. The novel consists of Clara's efforts to get out of the engagement without doing something so scandalous as eloping with someone else.

The characters are drawn vividly and with depth. The incidents are both amusing and realistic. Clara Middleton is one of the great witty heroines of English literature, perhaps the wittiest Victorian heroine.

The beginning can be slow going. Meredith likes to use twenty words when other people might use ten. He also likes to play verbal games. As you proceed in the novel and get used to the style, you can have a lot of fun picking out the puns, allusions, etc.

This is Meredith's best novel. The plot is tightly controlled and the ending is pure comedy in the tradition of Fielding, Austen and Thackeray. I highly recommend this novel to anyone who feels comfortable reading Victorian English and likes a good love-comedy.

Selected Poems of George Meredith
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Selected Poems of George Meredith
George Meredith
Manufacturer: Adamant Media Corporation
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Poetry | Literature & Fiction | Subjects | Books
Meredith, George | ( M ) | Authors, A-Z | Literature & Fiction | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 1421238063
Release Date: 2000-11-28

Book Description

This Elibron Classics book is a reprint of a 1903 edition by Archibald Constable and Company, Ltd., Westminster.

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Diana of the Crossways
George Meredith
Manufacturer: BiblioBazaar
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

Contemporary | General | Literature & Fiction | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 1426417845

Book Description

Among the Diaries beginning with the second quarter of our century, there is frequent mention of a lady then becoming famous for her beauty and her wit: ‘an unusual combination,’ in the deliberate syllables of one of the writers, who is, however, not disposed to personal irony when speaking of her.

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